"Bazuka is a full malware framework," ThreatFabric said in a technical report.
Discovery and overall architecture
Dutch mobile security company ThreatFabric said it discovered Bazuka in late October 2026 while investigating an NFC-relay banking Trojan. According to ThreatFabric, Bazuka is composed of a dropper/downloader, a core, and 23 modules that together support overlays, keylogging, 2FA and SMS interception, remote control, and crypto-address swapping.
The core acts as the orchestrator: it maintains communication with command-and-control (C2), loads additional DEX modules, dispatches commands, collects device information, and manages permissions and component updates. Communication with C2 uses two WebSocket channels — a Control channel for issuing commands and a Data channel for exfiltrating data and screen capture streams.
Novel overlay technique and ADB/accessibility abuse
ThreatFabric highlighted a novel overlay technique that lets the trojan take a screenshot of the home screen or lock screen and display that image on demand, masking malicious activity running in the background. This screenshot-as-overlay is used to cover actions like credential harvesting or automated fraud while the victim perceives the device as unchanged.
The core abuses Android Debug Bridge (ADB) shell commands and accessibility services to request and automatically grant permissions. Important components of the core include mechanisms for enabling Wireless Debugging and completing the pairing process: "The core can open the system settings screen, find the relevant menu, enable Developer options, and then enable Wireless Debugging." ThreatFabric added that "when this mode is enabled, it also intercepts the PIN, which is then used to establish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon."
ThreatFabric also reported the core can disable Google Play protection via accessibility APIs and implements a self-destruct feature that clears local storage, deletes the database, and disables the application.

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Get coverageLLM integration, operator tooling, and victim scoring
Bazuka's control panel integrates artificial intelligence to assist operators. The panel supports both locally hosted models and models accessed through an API, and one sample prompt in the panel refers to a score — indicating the AI can likely be used to score victims and identify high-value targets. ThreatFabric warned: "Another equally concerning feature is the use of LLM chats directly within the control panel. AI agents are used to identify victims of interest."
The panel also provides operator tooling beyond scoring: it can create accounts for "traffers" (cybercriminals that drive victims to malware using lures) and build droppers with options for manifest permissions, a capability ThreatFabric says may be used to try to bypass Google Play app review.
Observed distribution chains and malicious droppers
ThreatFabric documented at least two observed attack-chain variants. In one, a dropper requests permission to install apps from third-party sources and downloads a standalone APK (observed as "com.tiktok.premium.pro") that serves as a stager. In the other, a downloader directly retrieves the main payload. One dropper masqueraded as a premium, adult-friendly version of TikTok with the package name "com.tiktok.premium."
ThreatFabric noted that dropper distribution is expected through at least two channels: traffers using social media ads or bogus sites to trick users into downloading them, and the Google Play Store — enabled in part by the panel's ability to customize manifest permissions for droppers.
Module set: breadth of capability for theft and device control
Bazuka ships with 23 modules that enable a wide range of data collection, fraud, and device control functions. ThreatFabric listed modules that include clip_monitor (clipboard address swapping), input_recorder (keylogging and identifying card numbers, addresses, passwords), screen_control (capture of lock screen PINs and unlock patterns via accessibility services), twofa (one-time-code capture), media (camera and microphone capture), device_control (ADB shell management), and uninstall_shield (to resist uninstall or force-stop), among others. The framework also includes modules for USSD interaction, call forwarding, proxying, and remote screencasting/phishing overlays.
What this means for security teams, end users, and traffers/operators
- Security teams and mobile defenders: Expect overlays that mimic real home or lock screens and ADB/Wireless Debugging enablement as key indicators. ThreatFabric calls out the combination of accessibility abuse and Wireless Debugging activation as notable — defenders should monitor for automated attempts to enable developer settings and for unexpected ADB pairings.
- End users and app reviewers: Bazuka droppers have been observed masquerading as legitimate apps (example package "com.tiktok.premium"); social-engineering through traffers and bogus sites is an identified distribution vector. Users should be cautious with sideload prompts and unexpected permission requests.
- Traffers and operators (as described by ThreatFabric): The control panel is designed to support traffer accounts and to build droppers with tailored manifest permissions, enabling both social-engineering distribution and potential Google Play delivery if review controls are evaded.
Bazuka arrived into public view alongside other Android threats evolving similar tradecraft: Zimperium zLabs last week detailed ArcticRAT, an Android malware family that also integrates LLM APIs and abuses overlays, VPN privileges, Hidden VNC, and Wireless Debugging. Zimperium researchers Rajat Goyal and Fernando Ortega wrote that ArcticRAT "has morphed into an enterprise grade, AI-powered, Remote Access Trojan (RAT)" and detailed defenses like a "Black Screen" overlay and the use of VPN privileges "to null-route network communication on the victim's device, effectively blinding Google Play Protect telemetry during the staging phase."
ThreatFabric said the malware has not been attributed to any known threat actor, and noted the control panel displays UI elements in a mix of English and Russian. Together with ArcticRAT, Bazuka illustrates a convergence of LLM-assisted operator tooling, advanced overlay deception, and ADB/accessibility-based privilege escalation that defenders will need to detect and contain.
Original report: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/bazuka-android-malware-uses-fake-screen.html




