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CISA Chief Warns of Tech Outages, Stresses Resilient Systems

Empty podium in a large conference room with a projection screen in the background.
"It’s been a highly disruptive last couple of days," acting director Nick Andersen told an audience at FedTalks, capturing a string of recent technology failures that, in his view, underscore a single policy imperative: design systems to survive disruption, whatever the cause.

Nick Andersen’s message at FedTalks

Speaking at FedTalks, presented by FedScoop, Andersen framed recent outages not as isolated incidents but as demonstrations of why agencies and operators must build resilience into essential systems. He said the cause of an outage — whether "an IT outage or a bad patch, or a modernization update gone awry, or because of a malicious malicious cyber incident" — matters less than whether systems can continue to deliver outcomes. "At the end of the day, people just care about the outcomes," Andersen said, listing the basics people expect: clean drinking water, groceries on store shelves, and the ability to live without "consistent, significant disruptions."

Recent outages Andersen cited: flights, Outlook, banking slowdowns

Andersen pointed to what he described as a "cavalcade of tech outages" over the prior days, naming flight ground stops, the Microsoft Outlook global outage, and banking slowdowns as examples. He called the sequence "a good illustration of the types of things we’ve been talking about over the course of the last year or so," using the cluster of incidents to argue for engineering systems that anticipate and overcome outages and impacts.

CISA 2030 and a focus on resilience

Andersen tied his remarks to CISA’s longer-term planning, noting that emphasis on resilience appears in the "CISA 2030" strategy. He warned against letting social-media-driven conversations about a "vulnpocalypse" — accelerated vulnerability discovery attributed to artificial intelligence — eclipse enduring concepts like building and testing for resilience. "Perhaps forgotten" in the wake of rapid vulnerability discovery, he said, are the basics of designing systems to prevail when disruptions occur.

FAA ground stop, DHS and DOT comments, and the NSA system outage

When reporters asked about last week’s Federal Aviation Administration ground stop, Andersen directed them to comments from Department of Homeland Security Secretary MarkWayne Mullin and Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy. He added that "there’s nothing we found that indicates that there was any malicious cyber activity that went into that." On a separate matter — the National Security Agency’s internal communications system going down — Andersen referred the question to the Department of Defense.

What this means for technologists, policymakers, and the public

  • Technologists and security teams: Andersen flagged the social-media debate over a so-called "vulnpocalypse" and cautioned that rapid vulnerability discovery should not push aside the practical work of engineering and testing resilience. His remarks place resilience testing and anticipatory engineering at the center of risk reduction efforts.
  • Policymakers and agency leaders: The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee is scheduled this week to hold a hearing for Michael LaSapio to serve as the agency’s permanent director. Andersen said he would continue to serve "wherever people give me the opportunity to serve" and looked forward to the nominee’s chance to speak with senior decision makers on the committee, underscoring the administrative and legislative interest in CISA’s mission.
  • End users and the general public: Andersen spoke directly to public concerns — uninterrupted water, stocked grocery shelves, and ordinary daily life — framing resilience not as a technical abstraction but as the protection of everyday services people notice when they fail.

Andersen’s line of argument was straightforward: whether failures stem from software patches, modernization efforts, routine IT errors, or hostile activity, the operational yardstick is the same — did critical services continue to function? He urged attention to engineering choices and testing regimes that reduce the need for the public to plan around "consistent, significant disruptions."

The questions left open in Andersen’s remarks were procedural and immediate: how CISA’s resilience emphasis in CISA 2030 will translate into concrete guidance or requirements, how agency leaders and vendors will prioritize resilience in procurement and operations, and how the Senate hearing this week for Michael LaSapio will shape leadership continuity at the agency. Andersen’s repeated referral of specific outage investigations to other agencies — DHS, DOT, and the Department of Defense — also highlights that attribution and lines of responsibility remain operational levers as much as technical problems.

Link to original story: https://cyberscoop.com/cisa-nick-andersen-cyber-resilience-outages/