"The compromise of the software development (CI/CD) infrastructure and the software code-signing server indicated that the attack would likely develop into a supply chain scenario," Kaspersky said.
BO Team intrusion: scope and attribution
Kaspersky's ICS CERT attributed a months-long compromise of a Russia-based software developer's infrastructure to a threat actor tracked as BO Team (also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy). The affected company was not named in Kaspersky's disclosure but is described as operating from within Russia with "a customer base in the Russian Federation." Kaspersky says the compromise began no later than June 2025 when the company contacted the vendor, and BO Team has been active since at least 2023.
Orange Cyberdefense characterized the group's motivation: "Their primary motivation is to degrade the Russian military-industrial complex to weaken Moscow's operational capabilities on the battlefield," and to carry out "cognitive warfare aimed at humiliating Russian institutions." Kaspersky's technical telemetry tied the activity to IP addresses 193.3.23[.]236 and 80.76.42[.]139, both belonging to a provider in Ukraine, and noted the attackers followed a standard work schedule in a time zone only slightly different from that of the victim.
Exploitation of VMware vCenter via CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell)
According to Kaspersky, attackers initially compromised an exposed Linux terminal server via an open SSH service and performed broad reconnaissance across services (SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM, LDAP). They also made repeated login attempts to internal portals and third-party sites such as proxy-sale[.]com, start.duckduckgo[.]com, vcsa.vmware[.]com, and vulners[.]com.
The intrusion succeeded in exploiting a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 (referred to in the report as Log4Shell and LogJam), granting a remote root shell. From the compromised vCenter the attackers connected to ESXi hypervisors over SSH, identified hosts, and deployed a persistent backdoor disguised as a PostgreSQL component by placing a script named "pgcache" in /etc/cron.hourly/.

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End the scrambleBackdoors, DNS-controlled activation, and living-off-the-land tactics
The planted cron script downloaded and executed a secondary script from a nofrillsdns[.]com hostname (lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com) which fetched and ran the Global Socket (GSocket) utility to enable remote control. Kaspersky noted variants that pointed to hostname-specific payloads staged under similar nofrillsdns[.]com names. The attackers exploited the nofrillsdns service's ability to create domains via curl and used a fallback DNS record of 127.0.0.1; activating the backdoor required only changing the DNS record so the script would download and run the payload.
Kaspersky described deliberate efforts to minimize malware footprints and detection: extensive use of legitimate system tools (RDP, SSH, SCP), LotL techniques, timestomping, obfuscation, and deletion of event logs. Where malware was used, it was targeted; in most Windows systems the attackers relied on built-in utilities such as tasklist.exe, findstr.exe, taskmgr.exe, and ipconfig.exe to map security solutions and network interfaces.
Supply-chain objectives: code-signing server, GitLab, and Ansible access
The adversary searched for secrets on virtual machines and ultimately breached the GitLab virtual machine, obtaining source code repositories and the server's private key. Using that private key, attackers accessed the organization's Ansible orchestration system. Kaspersky flagged a server that signed compiled builds of the company's commercial software as a likely prize — suitable either for injecting malicious code into builds immediately prior to signing, or for stealing the organization's digital signature to sign malware later.
Post-exploitation activity included use of an obfuscated bash script to decrypt and run an ELF SSH backdoor, collecting virtual machine and firewall information, and abusing a hypervisor certificate to reach systems in a second virtualization cluster.
Credential theft, domain compromise, and a failed phishing follow-up
Kaspersky detailed a multi-stage credential harvest: attempts to dump lsass.exe (including an attempted Nanodump run and an alternate approach using comsvcs.dll), dumping the registry to decrypt ntds.dit and extract domain credentials, and transferring collected material via scp. Attackers used a domain administrator's Kerberos ticket to log into the domain controller and took advantage of reused administrator passwords across domains to expand control to the Windows estate.
Other tactics included modifying /usr/bin/nxnode-login to capture credentials into /dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174 and brute-forcing an administrator terminal server password after roughly 2,500 failed attempts to place the Ansible private key. After defenders interrupted the intrusion, the attackers launched a phishing campaign in late July with the subject "Account disconnected from the mail server." The phishing email bypassed SPF and DKIM checks, indicating the attackers had access to a private key from the organization's mail server; the campaign was detected and blocked.
What this means for the software vendor, customers, and defenders
For the targeted software vendor: Kaspersky concluded the intrusion likely aimed at a supply-chain outcome—either implanting malicious code into signed builds or stealing signing keys for later use—making rapid containment and code-base integrity checks urgent for the organization and its customers.
For customers of the vendor: any organization relying on the developer's signed binaries will need to verify signatures, update affected components if advised, and monitor for unexpected updates or certificate use that could indicate theft and subsequent misuse of signing keys.
For defenders and incident responders: Kaspersky's findings underscore the risk of exposed SSH services, the long tail of unpatched CVE-2021-44228-exploitable vCenter instances, and the difficulty of detecting LotL activity that uses system utilities and legitimate accounts. Rapid response measures in this case severed access before Kaspersky says the attackers could complete a supply-chain compromise.
Thanks to the defensive actions taken after detection, Kaspersky reported that the attackers lost access to the compromised infrastructure and were "apparently unable to bring the attack to its intended conclusion."




