In August 2026, we detected a new variant of the CoffeeLoader malware in the wild.
Armoury packer: GPU decryption moves from OpenCL to OpenGL
The infection chain begins with an NSIS-based installer that drops a patched 7z.dll into a temporary folder and launches it via rundll32.exe. That 7z.dll is a modified copy of the legitimate 7‑Zip library whose code space has been replaced with self‑decrypting shellcode: a new variant of the Armoury packer.
The older Armoury used the GPU for decryption through the OpenCL library (the advisory reproduces the OpenCL kernel). The new variant still uses GPU acceleration but switches to OpenGL compute shaders. The observed OpenGL shader reads data and key buffers and computes a simple XOR per element (using gl_GlobalInvocationID to index arrays), producing a decrypted result buffer. The packer’s payload model also changed: where the old packer delivered a DLL containing two shellcode fragments plus CoffeeLoader’s main body, the new packer now delivers an additional shellcode stage — the CoffeeLoader downloader.
CoffeeLoader downloader and persistence mechanisms
The shellcode decrypted by Armoury is a downloader that combines the earlier dropper and stager behaviors and adds downloader logic. To persist, the downloader copies the malicious 7z.dll into a subfolder of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% whose name is eight hexadecimal digits derived from system volume information, for example:
- C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll
- C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\b79faace\b79faace.dll
It registers autorun via the Run registry key, using rundll32.exe to call SetCodecs. The malware also writes an entry under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run with a value that prevents the user from disabling autorun through Task Manager. After persistence is set, the downloader starts one of several legitimate processes (dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe, or AtBroker.exe), injects itself, and requests the Trojan’s main body from a hardcoded C2 domain over HTTPS with a /payload?md5= path. The first request uses md5=00000000000000000000000000000000; subsequent requests send the MD5 of the previously downloaded payload.
The C2 response contains encrypted shellcode whose first 16 bytes serve as a simple XOR key; the HTTP response headers include X-Signature and X-Content-MD5. The X-Signature is verified against a public key embedded in the downloader; X-Content-MD5 provides the decrypted payload checksum. If both checks pass, the downloader allocates executable memory and transfers control to the decrypted shellcode.

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See what we buildMain CoffeeLoader module: small protocol changes, same functionality
Once launched, the main CoffeeLoader module is largely unchanged in capability. The campaign uses different symmetric keys for request/response encryption (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A) and replaces certificate validation of C2 responses with signature verification that relies on a long public key (hex bytes shown in the advisory). The binary protocol no longer uses the recognizable magic constant 0xC0FFEE42; it now uses 0xD1D57871. Despite these differences, the binary retains the same three remote commands for running code received from C2: inject into a process, save as an executable and run it, or save as a DLL and execute via rundll32.exe.
Retadup worm: USB propagation and the botnet’s second life
The most notable distribution vector is not phishing mail or fake download sites but the Retadup worm. First observed in 2017 and written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey, Retadup copied itself to all connected USB flash drives and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts. When an infected drive was opened on another PC and a shortcut clicked, the worm propagated and enrolled systems into a botnet that could download and run additional malware.
French law enforcement took control of Retadup’s C2 servers in July 2019 and issued commands that wiped the worm; more than 850,000 machines were disinfected and the botnet ceased to exist—until 2024. Beginning in 2024, someone re‑registered domains formerly used by Retadup and used them to instruct surviving worm instances to download third‑party payloads. Early on the revived C2s delivered SmokeLoader (packed with a 32‑bit Armoury); in early 2025 the same servers began delivering CoffeeLoader. Retadup’s C2 protocol is simple plaintext commands encoded in Base64 then hex; examples in the advisory decode to commands such as "ok||||sleep-600000-sleep" and "ok|||| download-http://rurjfvn.rs/update.exe:!:update.exe-download".
Geography, scale, and indicators of compromise
Our solutions blocked Retadup infection attempts on around 15,000 systems in the first three quarters of the year, far smaller than the 2019 scale; most were in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia. The advisory lists active Retadup C2 domains, CoffeeLoader C2s, hosting servers, and MD5 hashes observed in the campaign.
- Most active Retadup C2 servers: alphanoob[.]com, newblackage[.]com, newminersage[.]com, radnewage[.]com, minernewage[.]com, rad2016.publicvm[.]com, radpal.publicvm[.]com, roro2016.linkpc[.]net
- CoffeeLoader C2: internet-speed-check[.]com
- Servers hosting CoffeeLoader files: rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe, alphanoob[.]com/update.exe
- CoffeeLoader MD5 (DLL files): 2272dde17925d6179bea6fcf4d543d20, dce55eec553f6af16ba6481eaacb8638, 449c9e8bc6eb308aa3c46c88959e1a4f
- CoffeeLoader MD5 (NSIS-based installers): 58886d45a0c5e802a5d0a7545c36112d, cca710c5455c1fe2732771afbac16a09
What this means for technologists, enterprises, and end users
- Technologists and security teams: the campaign demonstrates a multi-stage chain that abuses legitimate libraries (7z.dll) and GPU compute (OpenGL) for decryption; detection should include behavioral signs such as unexpected rundll32.exe invocations, persistence under Run with eight‑hexadecimal‑digit folder names, and integrity checks on 7z.dll files.
- Enterprises and procurement leaders: the distribution vector remains physical media via Retadup’s USB propagation. Asset owners should inventory removable media policies and ensure removable drives are scanned and not autorun-enabled.
- End users: the worm spreads via infected USB drives and LNK shortcuts; avoid opening unknown removable media and heed prompts that launch rundll32.exe or unusually named library files.
The malware campaign ties an old worm’s propagation mechanism to a modern loader and GPU‑assisted packer — a technical evolution that reduces detection surface while preserving tried‑and‑true distribution. One critical unanswered point in the record is who re‑registered the Retadup domains in 2024; the advisory states the authorship of the revival is unknown. For defenders, the combination of USB propagation and layered cryptographic checks (X‑Signature plus X‑Content‑MD5) underscores that small, targeted infections can be made robust and persistent with limited infrastructure.
https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/




