"Upholding the apolitical nature of Australian intelligence is critical to the agencies’ ability to deliver in the national interest, especially as our strategic circumstances deteriorate," wrote the article in The Strategist.
Legal guardrails: ASIO Act 1979, ONI Act 2018 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001
The law in Australia sets out explicit limits designed to keep intelligence work apolitical. The ASIO Act 1979, the Office of National Intelligence Act 2018 and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 require regular briefings of the opposition leader and consultation on leadership appointments. They instruct agency heads to "take all reasonable steps to prevent their agencies being perceived as furthering or protecting ‘interests of any particular section of the community’." The Intelligence Services Act goes further, specifying that the functions of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Australian Signals Directorate and Australian Geospatial‑intelligence Organisation "do not include undertaking any activity for the purpose of furthering the interests of an Australian political party or other Australian political organisation."
Partisanship, politicisation, and historical examples
Politicisation in intelligence is commonly understood as party political bias. The article notes that Australia has not been immune: it cites instances that have occurred, though "much less common than claimed." It references the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s official history, which criticises clandestine sharing of politically sensitive information with backbench members of parliament during the 1949–1972 Coalition government. It also cites the Combe‑Ivanov affair as an example where perceptions of politicisation — "unfounded left‑wing incredulity" in that case — complicated public understanding after a high‑ranking Labor official was found to have links to a KGB officer.
Audit-ready is a season. It shouldn't be.
Evidence in spreadsheets, controls drifting between audits, frameworks multiplying on flat headcount. Nubivance runs continuous compliance on Rapid7 Cyber GRC - SOC 2, HIPAA, ISO 27001, PCI, CMMC.
End the scramblePolicy‑isation: blurring analysis and policy preferences
Beyond partisanship, the article highlights a second form of politicisation: the erosion of the arm’s‑length separation between intelligence and policy. In Australia this concern is framed as "appropriate demarcation of responsibility and accountability." The piece acknowledges that governments sometimes ask the intelligence community to "fill policy gaps" — which can be appropriate if ministers and departments recognise the anomaly — but warns against intelligence being used to pursue political ends or to selectively bolster particular policy preferences. It notes that leaking intelligence reporting has been a persistent problem abroad, particularly in Washington.
Workforce outreach, public perception, and unintended political character
The article draws attention to a third, subtler risk: that well‑intentioned organisational messaging and workforce initiatives can assume "an unintended political character when perceived externally." Examples of sensitive topics include approaches to "diversity, equity and inclusion" and "critical approaches to questions of sovereignty, sexuality or gender relations." While such statements often stem from a sincere desire to build 21st‑century workforces, the risk is that internal norms — which may be common in Canberra rooms and among younger, more highly educated staff — will jar with broader public attitudes and be read as political signalling. The result can be an "unconscious drift into politicisation" in an era of political, social and cultural fragmentation.
What this means for intelligence agencies, the Australian public, and governments
- Intelligence agencies: Must balance two objectives that can pull in different directions — attracting talent from the widest national pool and building broader public support. The article urges agencies to be "open and humble," to be alive to diverse views (including within their own ranks), and to ground public communications in practical outcomes rather than first‑principles messaging.
- The Australian public: May be sensitive to messaging that appears to reflect particular political or cultural positions. Because public understanding of intelligence work is often "little informed or ill‑informed," perception risks can erode the broad support agencies need to operate effectively.
- Governments and ministers: Should avoid tying agencies and the broader public service to their "own necessarily political attitudes and public signalling," and should support agencies by allowing them to research the actual effects of workforce initiatives before public rollout.
The article does not argue for abandoning outreach to underrepresented groups; rather, it recommends that agencies "accentuate unity, not division," be hard‑headed about external perceptions, and support research into how workforce initiatives actually affect the intelligence community. It ends with a pointed comparison: "The US can ultimately, maybe, afford chaos and dysfunction in its national security institutions. Australia cannot."
