Since 2017, New South Wales’ shark‑surveillance program has flown more than 160,000 missions—predominantly using DJI drones—and in 2026 it received A$34 million to expand monitoring across 97 beaches, including year‑round coverage at 72 locations.
Penny Wong’s pledge to the Philippines and the technology choice
Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, this week pledged surveillance drones to the Philippines that she specified must be made in Australia and the United States, not in China. The decision reflects an explicit preference for what the pledge describes as “the most trusted tech,” even where that choice is more expensive than widely available Chinese alternatives. The government also provided Skydio drones and training to the Philippines, a concrete example the source identifies as pointing to broader regional opportunities.
How deeply Chinese-made drones are embedded in public operations
Many Australian government agencies use AI‑enabled DJI drones for policing, emergency response, environmental monitoring and infrastructure inspection. The Australian Federal Police has begun moving away from DJI products, but Chinese‑made systems remain widely deployed. Beyond the New South Wales shark program, Western Australia has deployed autonomous drone systems for policing, transport monitoring and critical‑infrastructure operations. At present, the source notes, Australia regulates where drones may fly but not where their data may go.
The risk resides in the data, firmware and software layer
The source emphasises that a modern enterprise drone is not merely “a flying camera” but a networked system: sensors, controllers, mobile apps, automated docks, mission‑planning software, cloud services, AI analytics and remote operations centres. Repeated flights can produce updated geodetic survey data on terrain and activity; bridge and substation inspections can reveal access points, equipment layouts and security arrangements; coastal and traffic monitoring can expose patterns around ports and transport corridors. Aggregated, these data have intelligence value.
DJI has said information from users outside mainland China can be stored on servers in the United States or Europe. The source warns, however, that server location alone does not resolve who can alter firmware, administer accounts, change software, provide remote assistance or withdraw future support. It points to China’s National Intelligence Law, which requires organisations and citizens to assist state intelligence work, and to a broader data regime that gives the state considerable authority over data storage and cross‑border transfers—factors the source calls a jurisdictional risk for Chinese technology suppliers.
Those concerns have already informed other Australian decisions: the government banned TikTok and DeepSeek from official devices and removed HikVision cameras from sensitive locations. The source argues a similar, partial ban on Chinese drone companies is warranted and notes that Home Affairs’ 2026 drone‑security consultation is a positive step.
International restrictions, supply dependence and allied coordination
The source catalogues several international actions: Washington added DJI to Department of Commerce and Treasury restriction lists in 2020 and 2021; in 2025 the Federal Communications Commission placed foreign‑produced drones and DJI services on its Covered List; and the Department of Defense declared DJI to be a “Chinese military company.”
Supply chains matter. The source notes Beijing sanctioned US drone maker Skydio in 2024 over its sales to Taiwan; Skydio said restrictions on Chinese battery supplies forced it to ration production. It also reports that Chinese export controls on drones and components constrained Ukraine more severely than Russia, giving Beijing leverage over technology central to the conflict. The source recommends Australia work with the United States, Japan, Ukraine, Taiwan and other trusted partners to collectively reduce dependence on DJI, share testing results, and foster internationally coordinated “trusted drone standards.”
What this means for Defence, civil agencies, and the public
- Defence: The source describes Defence taking steps to support domestic suppliers such as Sypaq and taking delivery of 300 drones from AMSL Aero, Grabba Technologies and Boresight (each supplying 100 units). These purchases are pictured as early steps to build trusted, sovereign capability.
- Civil agencies and procurement leaders: The source urges aggregation of demand, adoption of common technical standards and multi‑year commitments to justify investment in secure software, sensors, communications and docking systems—measures intended to make domestic and allied suppliers commercially viable.
- The public and local partners: The source warns that routine civilian geospatial collection can be repurposed; it frames Wong’s technology choice for the Philippines as a model for future regional assistance packages that could simultaneously strengthen maritime capacity and create markets for trusted suppliers.
The central point the source leaves on the table is blunt: in an era of great‑power competition, Australia must retain control over not just the drones in its skies but what they record, where that data goes and who can alter the underlying software. Until those controls are in place—through procurement, standards, allied coordination and targeted restrictions—the source warns, Australia will continue, to use its phrase, “flying blind.”
