"critical but more limited" — that is how the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy characterizes the support the United States would provide if South Korea assumes primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, setting the terms for a decision that the two commanders-in-chief must now make.
The Chain of Command and the Two Commanders-in-Chief
Wartime operational control (OPCON) exercised by the commander of the ROK‑U.S. Combined Forces Command rests on two separate delegations of authority. For U.S. forces the delegation runs from the U.S. president through the secretary of defense to the combatant commander; for South Korean forces it is exercised under the South Korean president’s authority as commander‑in‑chief. That structure makes OPCON transition not merely a military or administrative adjustment but a joint political decision: the two commanders‑in‑chief must agree to delegate their authorities to the Future Combined Forces Command.
Military concerns: distinct but complementary
The source lays out differing priorities for the two sides. Seoul’s concerns focus on the credibility of extended deterrence, reinforcement deployment in a contingency, and potential command gaps during transition. Washington’s concerns center on possible degradation of the combined defense posture, institutional and political challenges of U.S. forces operating under a South Korean general, and risk perceptions within the Combined Forces Command and parts of Congress.
Because no military preparation removes all risk, the authors argue political leaders must acknowledge transitional vulnerability openly and manage it with alliance‑level political‑strategic steps alongside military compensating measures. The South Korean president is asked to demonstrate a working crisis decision‑making chain — from the president to the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Future Combined Forces Command — through exercises and verification. The U.S. president is asked to reaffirm the defense commitment and to institutionalize extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
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End the scrambleResources and assets: ISR, space, strategic deployments and sustained budgets
The report makes resource pledges central to any real transition. South Korea must connect its roadmap for core military capabilities to its Mid‑Term Defense Plan and secure funding and sustainability via the National Assembly. The United States must commit assets and posture to provide bridging and enduring capabilities — specifically naming intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space, strategic asset deployment, and reinforcement plans.
Multiyear, bipartisan commitments on both sides are urged to ensure the political decision is backed by operational reality. The U.S. administration’s response to the National Defense Authorization Act provision concerning transition‑related funding and certification is cited as part of this task.
Alliance architecture: avoid transactional linkage, clarify structural links
The authors warn against treating transition as a transactional bargaining chip tied to unrelated issues. Defense cost‑sharing debates, reductions in U.S. Forces Korea, or broader regional command concepts could become transactional levers — a course the paper opposes. Instead, it recommends separating transactional negotiations from structural decisions that are legitimately connected to transition: command relationships among the Future Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, and U.S. Forces Korea; access to United Nations Command rear bases; and the alliance’s regional role.
Within the U.S. government, the paper calls for presidential leadership to align White House alliance policy, defense burden‑sharing, and combatant command relationships into a single strategic direction. In Seoul, it advises against making out‑of‑area contributions a condition for progress on transition and cautions against reducing OPCON to a mere symbol of sovereignty.
U.S. Congress and the South Korean National Assembly: different roles, shared need for explanation
The U.S. Congress is already active through the National Defense Authorization Act, scrutinizing whether conditions are met, the Future Combined Forces Command’s national command reporting chain, relations with the United Nations Command, nuclear proliferation implications, and military risk. The paper warns that if the U.S. administration fails to address these systematically, congressional caution and operational hesitancy will slow working‑level progress.
By contrast, the South Korean National Assembly has no parallel formal procedure; yet the paper argues it must be brought into regular reporting and verification because it provides the budget and institutional arrangements. Executives in both capitals are urged to explain clearly why transition is necessary now, what will change and what will not, and what each legislature must authorize.
After more than 20 years of formal arrangements and more than a decade of preparation under a conditions‑based plan, the authors conclude the remaining gateway is political. With verification of the Future Combined Forces Command’s full operational capability scheduled for 2026 and the 57th Security Consultative Meeting looming, the report frames the choice as one for the two commanders‑in‑chief to make and to own — aligning perceptions of war aims and escalation thresholds, committing resources, designing a future command architecture, and explaining the political judgment to their publics and parliaments.
