In 2022 Japan and Australia signed a reciprocal access agreement — the first Tokyo had extended to a partner beyond the United States — a concrete step that the author of a recent analysis says captures how core US allies are working to sustain a wavering international order.
Stewarding: a deliberate alternative to hedging
Research published in early July for International Affairs describes a pattern the author calls "stewarding": core US allies tightening alignment with Washington while building lateral bonds with one another to preserve the US-led order even as Washington’s leadership appears uncertain. The piece contrasts stewarding with hedging. Where hedging intentionally creates ambiguity about alignment, stewarding reinforces the existing order — sometimes without direct US leadership — and layers new security ties on top of traditional alliance relationships.
Reciprocal access, ministerial dialogues, and new treaties
The dynamic shows up in treaties and ministerial workstreams. After years of ministerial dialogues, Japan and Australia concluded their 2022 reciprocal access agreement. Both states later reached similar understandings with Britain — Japan with Britain in 2023; Australia with Britain in 2024. Britain in May also signed a new security treaty with Poland that explicitly named Russia as the overarching threat to Europe. The author presents these moves as evidence that these allies are deepening security guarantees among themselves while remaining committed to Washington.
Defence-industrial integration: frigates, fighters and interoperability
Stewarding is visible in defence procurement and collaborative industrial projects. Australia’s frigate overhaul pairs a derivative of the British Type 26 with the Japanese Upgraded Mogami class, signalling a simultaneous bet on British and Japanese shipbuilding. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) — Japan’s partnership with Britain and Italy to develop a sixth‑generation fighter — is described in the source as framed explicitly as “a cornerstone of global security.” The GCAP founders emphasised the design’s future interoperability with the US at the outset, and Australia may yet join the programme. These are not routine purchases: warships and fighters are framed as building blocks for deterrence in key theatres.
AUKUS, basing and US platforms: Stirling, Virginia‑class and SSN‑AUKUS
The analysis underlines that stewarding does not replace alignment with Washington. Allies continue to buy large quantities of US equipment — fighter jets, tanks, missile and artillery systems — and are deepening basing infrastructure to host more US troops and materiel. For Canberra, the author points to AUKUS as emblematic: Pillar One involves the US operating submarines from HMAS Stirling, the sale of three Virginia‑class boats to Australia, and US help for Australia and Britain to build their SSN‑AUKUS class. The piece also notes Australia’s emerging role as a regional workshop for maintaining F‑35s and Abrams tanks, tying allied logistics and sustainment into the same webs of cooperation.
What this means for policymakers, procurement leaders, and regional adversaries
- Policymakers — National governments in Canberra, Tokyo, London and Warsaw are portrayed as choosing explicit alignment over ambiguity: they are deepening traditional ties with Washington while creating lateral security arrangements to buttress deterrence even during phases of US uncertainty.
- Procurement leaders — Defence procurement choices such as Type 26 derivatives, the Upgraded Mogami class, participation in GCAP, and purchases of US platforms reflect deliberate industrial signalling. These decisions carry both capability and sustainment implications, and they lock in interoperability pathways with allied partners.
- Regional adversaries — The author frames the allied moves as responses to "revisionist challengers." By layering multilateral pacts and shared procurement, the core allies aim to sustain regional deterrence irrespective of fluctuations in US political leadership.
The central claim is straightforward: despite widespread talk of hedging and alliance fraying, a cluster of core US allies — Australia, Japan, Poland and Britain — are both tightening ties with Washington and knitting new lateral defence links among themselves. Their investments in access agreements, shared procurement programmes and basing arrangements are intended to keep the order that has underpinned security in place, even when Washington seems less steady. Whether that ensemble of practical commitments will prove durable in the face of future shocks is the concrete question the record now poses.
