"The real crisis is not that regional powers have become more active diplomats. It is that the United Nations’ absence from major diplomatic crises has become normal," the article warned.
Regional intermediaries in practice: Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan
The past decade has seen a cluster of states move from the diplomatic periphery to the centre of crisis management. According to the source, Oman has "become the trusted back channel between the United States and Iran," repeatedly hosting sensitive talks that few others could convene. Qatar has "established itself as perhaps the world’s most active mediator," brokering negotiations between the United States and the Taliban, facilitating hostage and ceasefire talks involving Hamas, supporting dialogue in Sudan and Chad, and acting as an intermediary across regions from the Horn of Africa to Latin America. Turkey has "positioned itself as a bridge between East and West," hosting negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, brokering the Black Sea Grain Initiative and keeping lines of communication open with actors that increasingly refuse direct engagement.
Perhaps most striking, Pakistan — despite internal security, political, and economic pressures and long-standing unresolved border disputes — hosted "the first direct, high-level negotiations between Washington and Tehran in decades" during the ongoing Iran crisis, creating space for de‑escalation even though the peace effort "ultimately did not endure." These examples show a pattern: states with particular relationships, leverage or willingness to engage are filling mediation roles the United Nations once occupied.
The United Nations' earlier role and a standard to which it was once held
The article traces a contrasting era when the UN secretary-general's office was expected to exercise active political leadership. It cites Secretary‑General U Thant's "quiet diplomacy" during the Cuban Missile Crisis as having "helped create space for de‑escalation between Washington and Moscow," and notes his engagement in the Congo and in successive Middle East crises. Preventive diplomacy, the piece argues, was one of the UN’s greatest advantages: relatively inexpensive, politically flexible and measured by the conflicts that never occurred.
That history set expectations that the UN would convene adversaries and provide universal legitimacy and continuity in ways individual states could not. The article stresses that the UN was not meant to compete with regional powers but to offer a universal mechanism for maintaining international peace and security.
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See what we buildWhy the shift has happened: rivalry, caution and confidence
The article does not point to a single moment of decline. Instead it characterises the UN’s retreat as the cumulative effect of three forces: geopolitical rivalry, institutional caution and the growing confidence of regional powers to act independently. The practical result, the source says, is a system in which mediation is "fragmented, improvised and increasingly dependent on circumstance rather than institution." In short, diplomacy now often depends on which state happens to hold the right relationships at the right time.
What this means for Australia, the United Nations, and regional intermediaries
- Australia: The article frames the issue as a strategic necessity for Australia. Because Australia "has long relied on a stable, rules‑based order," the country faces a world where no single middle power "however capable, can shape the international environment alone" — making the strength of multilateral institutions directly relevant to its security.
- The United Nations: The UN loses an instrument it once wielded quietly and broadly. The retreat from active political diplomacy weakens an institution designed to provide "legitimacy, continuity and a universal framework" beyond the interests of individual states.
- Regional intermediaries (Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan): These states gain influence by convening parties and preserving channels of communication others cannot. Their diplomacy can be "highly effective," but it is also "necessarily selective" — tied to influence, relationships and strategic interest.
A missing centre in the world's peace architecture
The article leaves readers with a stark assertion: the world’s peace architecture was never meant to depend on "whichever state happened to have the right relationships at the right moment." Regional states may reduce the risk of immediate escalation in some crises, but the normalisation of the UN's absence removes a universal convenor whose comparative advantage is continuity and perceived neutrality. If preventive diplomacy is measured by the wars that never happened, the piece argues, the loss is not easily quantified — until a crisis occurs that the ad hoc network of intermediaries cannot contain.
