The number of chief risk officers (CROs) in UK government has more than doubled over the past decade, yet most risk professionals in Whitehall say they still lack the influence to shape major decisions, a new National Audit Office (NAO) report finds.
The spending watchdog published its report, Risk management in government: improving capability and decision making, on November 18. The NAO argues that effective risk management is vital to manage fast-emerging threats, pointing to recent PHP vulnerabilities as the kind of technical change that can quickly disrupt public services and create costly recovery work.
Chief risk officers in Whitehall struggle for influence
Growth in headcount has not translated into decision-making power. The NAO found that 58% of risk professionals it polled said they are typically "brought in too late to shape decisions." The report added: "We found limited evidence of major decisions or organizational direction changing because of input from risk professionals." It also warned that, in hierarchical organizations, "the often low seniority of those leading risk teams can also restrict their access to senior decision-making forums."
Audit and Risk Assurance Committees (ARACs) face cyber skills gaps
The report highlights a specific governance weak point: Audit and Risk Assurance Committees should provide independent advice and challenge to the board and accounting officer, but their effectiveness is being constrained by capability shortfalls. The NAO noted "skills gaps among committee members in evolving areas such as cybersecurity," and added that leaders do not always understand the cyber risks recorded in risk registers "or recognize how they relate to their strategic objectives."

Audit-ready is a season. It shouldn't be.
Evidence in spreadsheets, controls drifting between audits, frameworks multiplying on flat headcount. Nubivance runs continuous compliance on Rapid7 Cyber GRC - SOC 2, HIPAA, ISO 27001, PCI, CMMC.
End the scrambleLegacy technology, staff shortages and the limits of risk appetite
Many departments are defining a risk appetite, but less than half (47%) of those polled said their stated appetite actually informs decisions. In June 2026, most reported that the majority of their principal risks were outside their stated tolerance. The NAO pointed to "legacy technology and specialist staff shortages" as constraints on departments' ability to bring cybersecurity risks within appetite, an observation that ties the abstract language of risk registers to concrete capability gaps on the ground.
British Library case shows cost of delayed mitigation
The NAO singled out an operational example that underlines the stakes. The British Library had already identified risks from growing third-party access to its IT systems, but was breached before planned changes were implemented. The report uses that sequence—recognition of risk, planned mitigation, then breach before mitigation was in place—to show how known vulnerabilities can become crises when implementation lags.
What this means for technologists, policymakers, and the public
- Technologists and security teams: Skills shortfalls and legacy systems are hampering the ability to reduce cyber risk to within agreed tolerances; the NAO points to the need for continuous monitoring, living risk registers, and stronger assurance mapping to make technical risk visible to decision makers.
- Policymakers and senior leaders: The NAO urges that risk management be embedded "at the heart of how [government] plans, spends and delivers," and warns that low seniority for risk leads and late engagement of risk professionals limit the ability to adapt to uncertainty.
- The public and public services: The report warns that the current mix of capability gaps and delayed mitigation means risks can escalate into crises with "lasting consequences for public services," as the British Library example demonstrates.
Gareth Davies, head of the NAO, framed the report as a call to action: "The past few years have highlighted the scale and complexity of the risks facing government and how quickly they can escalate into crises, with lasting consequences for public services." He said government has made good progress but "must now put risk management at the heart of how it plans, spends and delivers, making sure that senior leaders are equipped to spot vulnerabilities early and to take well-managed risks to improve public services." The NAO cautioned that this task will become "ever more important as more decisions and public spending are devolved."
The essential thread running through the report is straightforward: increases in risk staffing and the existence of registers are not enough. Without earlier involvement of risk professionals, better cyber expertise at oversight committees, faster implementation of mitigations, and continuous risk monitoring, known vulnerabilities will continue to turn into costly disruptions for public services.




