"ROMULUS likely operates as a delivery service, distributing CNCMachineRMS and Legion Loader through separate chains while retaining ClickFix and signed binary sideloading techniques," Blackpoint Cyber researchers Sam Decker, Nevan Beal, and Andi Ursry said in a report.
ROMULUS as a delivery service
Researchers at Blackpoint Cyber describe ROMULUS not as a single malware family but as a delivery platform that leverages ClickFix-style lures and established sideloading techniques to distribute distinct payloads. The platform has been observed delivering at least two different final implants — CNCMachineRMS and Legion Loader — via separate infection chains while retaining common elements such as ClickFix lures and signed-binary DLL sideloading.
CNCMachineRMS: capabilities and delivery
Blackpoint Cyber's analysis identifies a previously undocumented remote access trojan (RAT) called CNCMachineRMS as a ROMULUS-delivered payload. The trojan's feature set includes remote desktop control, screen streaming, microphone and camera capture, file management, system reconnaissance, and the ability to run additional payloads on demand. Communication with attacker-controlled infrastructure is performed over DNS over HTTPS (DoH).
In one observed chain, ROMULUS delivered an MSI installer named "IconEdit2Turb.msi" that was executed via msiexec.exe using a PowerShell command. The installer posed as "Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool" and initiated a DLL sideloading chain that loaded a malicious DLL called "I++u.dll." That DLL decodes and runs embedded shellcode that launches CNCMachineRMS — the same final implant also distributed via ClickFix lures tied to ChatGPT Custom GPTs, according to Blackpoint Cyber.

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Get coverageDLL sideloading, signed binaries, and alternate loaders
ROMULUS activity continues a pattern of abuse observed across ClickFix campaigns: using legitimate, signed executables and sideloaded DLLs to evade detection and run malicious code. Blackpoint noted that CNCMachineRMS has also been delivered through another loader, BabaDeda Loader, in ClickFix attacks that leveraged the legitimately signed IBM SPSS IDE executable for DLL sideloading.
These sideloading chains often rely on seemingly benign installers or utilities — in the example above, an MSI masquerading as a known tool — executed with built-in Windows mechanisms (msiexec.exe and PowerShell) to start the malicious sequence.
ClickFix campaigns across platforms and delivery techniques
- ClickFix activity has been combined with EtherHiding across more than 70,000 compromised websites to run JavaScript that interacts with a Polygon smart contract; that fetches additional JavaScript that renders a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA and ultimately delivers malware (tracked as "slaiclind").
- Fake Zillow apartment-review pages have been used to present verification prompts that install NetSupport RAT on Windows visitors.
- A JavaScript-to-WordPress chain called TRUST#GRAFT was used to inject JavaScript into sites, render fake Cloudflare verification, fingerprint visitors, check for authenticated WordPress administrator browsers, and upload a malicious PHP plugin named Web Media Optimizer capable of injecting remote JavaScript and persisting via the mu-plugins directory.
- A sponsored Google search result for "amazon business" directed victims to a spoofed Amazon login domain containing a ClickFix command that leveraged Windows' fingerprint utility to launch a multi-stage chain resulting in NetSupport Client RMM and a version of Lumma Stealer.
- Abuse of Google Ads directed users to an Anthropic Claude shared chat that staged a fake "Download Claude" page with ClickFix commands that coaxed Mac users into running Terminal commands, deploying Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS).
- A typosquatted domain ("veriffication-redirect[.]com") used clipboard manipulation to trick users into running commands via the Windows Run dialog, then fetched Python payloads via DNS TXT records — including a previously unreported trojan called CrocoRat and a workflow targeting browsers, stored credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and seed phrases.
- ClickFix variants such as TerminalFix instruct users to open Windows Terminal and run commands that deploy Python-based tunneling implants via Lorem Ipsum Loader; this activity is being tracked as STAC4924. Another variant, InstallFix, has been used in search-ad-to-Bing redirect chains codenamed Adception to get Mac users to run malicious Terminal commands.
- ClickFix campaigns have also staged fake Cloudflare prompts on sites mimicking gaming marketplace DMarket, a Czech Microsoft Office authentication page, and U.K. retailer Howdens to deliver CrashHandler RAT and other remote access malware; one campaign even abused the Stripe API as a command-and-control channel to receive instructions and exfiltrate stolen data.
What this means for technologists, procurement teams, and end users
Technologists and security teams will need to account for delivery-layer consistency even when loaders and lures change: Blackpoint Cyber emphasizes that while attackers switch applications and loaders, a consistent malware architecture can link related activity. Monitoring for DLL sideloading through signed binaries, MSI-based installers executed via msiexec.exe and PowerShell, and DoH-based communications are concrete detection points cited by the researchers.
Procurement and enterprise IT leaders should be alert to trojanized installers masquerading as legitimate tools (for example, the "Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool" case) and to abuse of signed enterprise software for sideloading (the IBM SPSS IDE example). Ad campaigns, sponsored search results, and third-party chat landing pages were all used as vectors in the observed campaigns.
End users face social-engineering traps that span web prompts, sponsored search results, shared-chat pages, and direct phone contact. Examples in the reports show attackers convincing victims to run Terminal or Run-dialog commands, follow fake verification prompts, or open compromised WordPress pages that will deliver MSI packages or scripts.
As Blackpoint Cyber observed, changing delivery mechanisms mask a stable set of attacker behaviors; defenders who track architecture-level signals — DLL sideloading, MSI installers run through msiexec, and DoH command channels — may be better positioned to connect the dots across campaigns that, on the surface, use very different lures and loaders.




