"Ask many IT teams how they would recognize ransomware, and the answer is still “when files start changing extensions.”" — Iliyan Gerov, Acronis
Iliyan Gerov's central point: encryption is usually late
The practical lesson Gerov offers is stark: seeing files encrypted or renamed is often the last signal, not the first. The article stresses that encryption frequently follows credential theft, privilege escalation, defense evasion, lateral movement and data exfiltration. In some data‑extortion attacks, operators do not encrypt anything at all and instead steal data to use as leverage for extortion.
Five pre‑encryption signals defenders should watch
Gerov identifies five high‑value signals that deserve immediate attention because they commonly precede encryption or public data leaks. He lists them precisely:
- Defense tampering: attempts to stop security services, modify protection agents, load vulnerable drivers or clear event logs.
- Privilege escalation and lateral movement: unexpected privileged accounts, remote‑execution tools spreading across hosts or unusual server‑to‑server remote access.
- Data exfiltration: unusual outbound transfers from systems that do not normally upload large volumes of data.
- Recovery sabotage: deletion of shadow copies, backup catalogs or recovery options with tools such as vssadmin.exe, wbadmin.exe or bcdedit.exe.
- Pre‑encryption file behavior: rapid file enumeration, repeated read‑write‑rename activity and encryption‑like changes across local or network locations.
Those signals, the article argues, give defenders an opportunity to contain attacks before encryption spreads — but only when response actions are already defined and tested.

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End the scrambleHow ransomware actors typically gain initial access
The piece describes common initial access methods as exploitation of vulnerable internet‑facing systems, abuse of stolen credentials, and social engineering. An unpatched externally accessible service can provide a route into the environment; compromised credentials can allow entrance through legitimate remote‑access or cloud services; and social engineering targets users and identity processes. Once inside, attackers use that foothold to harvest credentials, escalate privileges, evade defenses and move laterally.
Immediate containment, evidence preservation, and recovery steps
Gerov lays out a sequence of actions organizations should take immediately after detecting ransomware‑related activity, emphasizing pre‑authorization and testing of automated responses for high‑severity conditions. The checklist includes:
- Isolate the affected workload while preserving the management channel needed for investigation.
- Stop malicious processes and quarantine confirmed malicious files.
- Protect evidence, including process trees, command lines, network connections and relevant logs.
- Identify and disable the compromised account, token or remote‑access path.
- Patch the exploited vulnerability or close the exposed service after containment.
- Restore affected files or workloads from a known‑good recovery point and validate the recovered environment before reconnecting it.
- Escalate to incident‑response, legal, privacy, insurance and communications stakeholders according to the organization’s response plan.
The article notes that Acronis EDR and XDR support investigation, isolation and response actions from the incident view, and that recovery actions depend on backup and recovery licenses, available recovery points and configuration. It also references Acronis MDR by Acronis TRU, offering 24/7 monitoring, investigation and response, with managed remediation and recovery included in the Advanced service tier within agreed scope and permissions.
What this means for technologists, procurement leaders, and end users
Technologists and security teams: prioritize detection of post‑compromise behaviors — defense tampering, lateral movement, data exfiltration and pre‑encryption file activity — and pre‑authorize tested containment playbooks rather than waiting for encryption to appear.
Procurement and IT operations leaders: consider controls that reduce exploitable exposure and protect recovery points. The article highlights vulnerability assessment and patch management, security posture management, unified endpoint and security policy management, data loss prevention and immutable backups as parts of a layered approach.
End users and administrators: harden identity and access channels and protect email and collaboration tools, because stolen credentials and social engineering are named vectors for initial access.
Gerov's central admonition is clear: early signals matter only if detection is paired with practiced containment and reliable recovery. Detecting defense tampering, privilege escalation, exfiltration, recovery sabotage or pre‑encryption file behavior gives teams a chance to stop an attack before it becomes a crisis — but that chance depends on controls, playbooks and tested recovery paths already being in place.




