"This agreement takes nothing away from NIH. It is about the Pentagon offering its services to help NIH do what it cannot on its own. NIH is not the victim here, it is the beneficiary," David F. Lasseter wrote after an Interagency Agreement signed last month drew headlines calling it a "Pentagon cash grab."
What the Interagency Agreement actually establishes
Signed by the Assistant Secretary of War for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs (OASW ND-CBD), Dr. Robert Kadlec, and NIH Director Dr. Jayanta Bhattacharya, the agreement creates a streamlined framework to accelerate development of medical countermeasures (MCMs), advanced diagnostics and personal protective equipment (PPE). It enables NIH to access the department’s specialized acquisition infrastructure — procurement, grant mechanisms and Other Transaction Authority — to execute NIH-requested and NIH-funded research orders.
Legal authorities: the Economy Act and Project Bioshield
The agreement rests on the statutory authority of the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. § 1535) and relevant provisions of Title 42, which allow interagency use of another agency’s acquisition capabilities. Lasseter also points to the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-276), under which Congress authorized NIH through NIAID to conduct expedited research and streamlined procurement mechanisms for MCMs and to enter interagency agreements with other U.S. government agencies.
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End the scrambleBridging the "valley of death" between discovery and deployable products
Lasseter frames the core problem not as a shortage of basic science but as the "valley of death" — the gap where laboratory discoveries fail to become mass-producible therapeutics, diagnostics or fieldable PPE. He argues NIH excels at foundational discovery, while converting those discoveries into scalable, manufacturable products requires program management, industrial-base coordination and specialized contracting the department can provide.
Public records cited in the piece show a limited conversion record: reports from the Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office and the Department of Health and Human Services indicate "numbers that are quite low—perhaps just five marketable products delivered to the Strategic National Stockpile." Lasseter lists those items as TPOXX and TEMBEXA for smallpox, EBANGA and INMAZEB for Ebola, and support for a midazolam autoinjector.
Governance and preserved authorities in Section IV.C.iii
The agreement’s language is described as "surgical in its scope" and includes a governance structure — identified in Section IV.C.iii — based on mutual concurrence for joint agendas. Crucially, it "explicitly preserv[es] NIH’s final authority on product requirements and profiles aimed at civilian populations and public health preparedness." At the same time, the department keeps final authority over requirements tailored to warfighter protection, military operational environments and tactical deployment, a separation Lasseter says ensures civilian health needs and defense operational needs are "mutually reinforced rather than compromised."
What this means for NIH, the Department of War, and the American public
- NIH: Will be able to request and fund acquisition and manufacturing support through the department’s contracting mechanisms, potentially reducing duplicate administrative overhead and accelerating production timelines for CBRN MCMs.
- The Department of War: Offers specialized acquisition infrastructure and retains authority over military-specific requirements; the agreement creates another channel for the department to supply warfighter-focused detection, protection and MCMs.
- The American public: Gains from dual-use capability — Lasseter emphasizes that antiviral therapeutics, antitoxins and diagnostics that protect deployed forces are often the same countermeasures needed domestically during a pandemic or biological attack, because "pathogens and radiological hazards do not distinguish between someone in uniform or wearing jeans."
Conclusion: evaluation will depend on procurement outcomes and RN investment
Lasseter urges judges to evaluate the agreement by results: whether it raises the success rate of converting NIH-funded science into fieldable MCMs rather than by headlines that called it a "cash grab." He also highlights a narrower gap the agreement might help close — investment in radiological and nuclear (RN) detection, protection and MCMs — noting the department currently spends an "infinitesimal amount" on RN defense compared with chemical and biological threats and that investment "must increase" to meet battlefield needs.
In short, the document positions the interagency deal as a tool to reduce the programmatic and procurement hurdles that have limited delivery of CBRN countermeasures; whether it becomes a model to emulate will depend squarely on whether it produces more usable products and speedier deliveries to the Strategic National Stockpile and operational forces.
