"Capability-based development rather than platform-based modernization," Admiral Naveed Ashraf told Quwa, offering a concise rationale for the Pakistan Navy's (PN) current procurement and force design choices.
From counting hulls to building reach
Admiral Ashraf framed the PN's modernization as a shift away from accumulating platforms for their own sake toward acquiring discrete, usable capabilities. The reporting describes three central outcomes: long-range, precision strike; deep system and subsystem integration across platforms with expanded sensor fusion and connectivity; and the use of uncrewed air, surface, and underwater vehicles to substitute for larger numbers of crewed platforms. That strategy is explicitly driven, in part, by a stated scarcity of funds, which limits the PN's ability to buy large fleets of surface combatants.
Long-range precision strike: Harbah NG, SMASH, CM-302 and the Fatah tests
The PN has already integrated a range of long-range strike weapons into its inventory. The Harbah NG anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and the SMASH anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) are described as established elements of the navy's strike capability. The service has also inducted the CM-302 supersonic-cruising missile (SSCM) on Tughril-class (Type 054A/P) frigates, and the Fatah-3 is identified as another SSCM that could see an anti-ship variant.
The Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) has tested the Fatah-4 ER and Fatah-2 ER, and the analysis in the piece highlights that the naval and ARFC missiles share platforms — a fact that underpins expectations of extended-range iterations of Harbah and SMASH. Crucially, the PN appears likely to base its longest-range ASCMs, ASBMs and SSCMs on land rather than rely on a larger surface fleet: land deployment removes the ship-dependent bottleneck and permits heavier, larger munitions that would be difficult to field from vessels, though it shifts the bottleneck to land batteries and vehicles.
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End the scrambleMesh networking, Sea Sultan, and distributed sensor fusion
The CNS described the PN’s intent to use mesh networking — a design where nodes such as ships, drones, and aircraft form a self-contained, resilient network — instead of a traditional hub-dependent network-centric warfare model. In a mesh setup, nodes continue to trade data if one node is lost, whereas an AEW&C-led hub model would suffer more severe degradation if the central platform were down.
The Sea Sultan long-range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMPA) is slated to play an AEW-like role within that mesh, not by replicating high-output radars like an Erieye or ZDK03-calibre system, but by plugging into a broader situational-awareness web. Mesh networking also supports relay and repeater tactics: Sea Sultan or AEW-like nodes can network to Shahpar-3 unmanned aerial vehicles in a manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) arrangement to extend sensor reach closer to contested areas, enabling over-the-horizon target tracking and management for Harbah-series missiles and others.
Uncrewed systems, OWA munitions, USVs and UUVs
The PN will expand the use of lower-cost uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) — and will use uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) — primarily to push sensors and communications outward. The Shahpar-3 is noted as able to deploy air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), one-way attack (OWA) munitions, and lightweight torpedoes, while Pakistan’s wider OWA drone strategy is expected to include munitions with 1,000–2,000+ km ranges. USVs and UUVs are expected to focus on extending sensing and connectivity rather than replacing major crewed platforms.
The analysis flags a technical constraint: high-speed munitions such as ASBMs and SSCMs are difficult to manage for mid-course targeting and will lean heavily on on-board guidance and compressed awareness-to-decision-to-effector chains. The mesh-repeater approach can help, but only if the PN’s future data links deliver sufficient throughput and low latency.
What this means for the Pakistan Navy, the Army Rocket Force Command, and the Pakistan Air Force
- Pakistan Navy (PN): The PN plans to sustain and expand its anti-access/area-denial posture by prioritizing long-range strike, integrated networking, and force multiplication through uncrewed systems rather than increasing large surface fleet numbers. Submarines remain an exception to the "not accumulating platforms" rule.
- Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC): ARFC testing of the Fatah-4 ER and Fatah-2 ER suggests cross-domain missile developments that could inform extended-range naval variants, reinforcing land-based coastal strike options that the PN intends to leverage.
- Pakistan Air Force (PAF): The PN’s discussion of future jet-powered UCAVs raises the possibility that the navy could integrate more-capable uncrewed combat systems rather than rely solely on PAF platforms, although the reported friction would be the UCAVs’ intrinsic logistics and operational demands rather than pilot training.
Admiral Ashraf’s succinct phrase captures an important strategic trade: constrained budgets are steering the PN toward a composite of land-based strike, mesh-enabled sensors, and distributed uncrewed nodes rather than a larger surface fleet. The approach promises resiliency and reach, but it rests on a critical technical hinge — whether the PN’s data links can provide the throughput and speed required to turn distributed sensors into reliable, real-time target management for high-speed ASBMs and SSCMs. That technical question will determine how fully this capability-based vision can replace sheer numbers of platforms.
