"The compromised versions are v0.11.0 v0.12.0 v0.13.0 v0.14.0 v0.15.0," OVHcloud CEO Octave Klaba wrote as he disclosed a GitHub compromise that briefly turned the company’s open-source command-line interface into a vehicle for information-stealing malware.
How the OVHcloud CLI repository was hijacked and detected
OVHcloud says an attacker gained control of a developer’s GitHub account and used it to modify releases of the OVHcloud CLI. The malicious release appeared at 14:47 on October 19 and was detected and blocked at 16:21 after a customer reported the issue, according to Klaba. GitHub’s release immutability setting had been disabled, permitting "a sufficiently privileged account to modify existing releases without passing CI/CD checks," Klaba said.
OVHcloud added that its CI/CD pipelines—including unit tests, functional tests, and CVE detection—were not impacted. OpenSourceMalware corroborated that the attacker uploaded malware-infected packages that were built locally rather than subverting the project’s CI/CD processes.
Which releases and platforms were affected
OVHcloud identified the compromised builds as v0.11.0 through v0.15.0. The company said older release v0.10.0 and the most recent release, v0.16.0, were clean. According to OpenSourceMalware, affected runtime platforms included macOS (Intel and ARM), Linux (x86_64 and ARM64), and Windows x86-64. The report noted that source builds and Docker images remained unaffected.
OVHcloud has enabled GitHub’s release immutability feature and stated it considers the incident resolved, but Klaba urged anyone who downloaded an affected CLI package to perform a system cleanup and revoke all secrets.
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See what we buildGlassWorm connection and characteristics of the malicious loader
OpenSourceMalware linked the compromise to a likely GlassWorm operation, a campaign pattern the researchers say has targeted the VSCode, OpenVSX, GitHub, and npm ecosystems since late 2025. The GitHub account used in the OVHcloud incident “had been compromised for more than half a year,” the researchers reported, and the account’s public repositories show a scripted history rewrite on 5 March 2026.
The researchers also describe a "hidden preinstall.js loader" that decodes to a second stage using a Solana memo dead drop. They noted that the associated wallet is a known GlassWorm indicator but did not analyze the malicious payload delivered through the trojanized OVHcloud CLI.
Klaba characterized the malware itself as low quality but direct in purpose: to "retrieve secrets from the disk." He warned, "The quality of the binary is poor but it can go all the way. If you are affected, please change all the secrets on your disk."
What this means for developers, system administrators, and OVHcloud customers
- Developers and system administrators who use the OVHcloud CLI to manage services or automate tasks must assume any secrets on machines that ran a compromised binary are exposed and revoke credentials accordingly.
- OVHcloud customers should verify which CLI release they installed; versions v0.11.0–v0.15.0 were flagged as compromised while v0.10.0 and v0.16.0 were reportedly clean. Customers relying on source builds or Docker images can note those remained unaffected in this incident.
- Security teams should treat the event as an example of damage that can follow when attacker access is gained to a developer account: OpenSourceMalware emphasized the account had been compromised for months, and Blue Report 2026—cited in the same reporting vein—observes that "once attackers are using valid credentials, prevention drops sharply."
OVHcloud mitigation, residual risks, and the next questions
OVHcloud’s immediate mitigations included blocking the malicious release, enabling GitHub release immutability, and advising users to remove or update installations and rotate secrets. The company considers the incident resolved but underscores that remediation depends on user action: if a compromised binary was executed, secrets on the disk should be assumed stolen and changed.
Open questions the record leaves open are operational and concrete: how many users installed one of the compromised releases, whether any secrets were exfiltrated before the customer report, and how long the attacker used the hijacked account to plant other artifacts. The incident reinforces a narrow but critical point Klaba made plainly: poor-quality malware can nonetheless "go all the way" and obliges immediate cleanup where it touched systems.
Source: OVHcloud CLI releases backdoored on GitHub to steal developer secrets — BleepingComputer
