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Emerging ThreatsSupply Chain Attacks

Optimizely Supply Chain Compromised, Malware Hits Major Sites

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“188 infected Optimizely JavaScript files belonging to 178 organizations” — that is the count security researcher Scott Helme reported after analyzing 1,611 Optimizely scripts and finding widespread malicious modifications that caused popular websites to load malware from a third-party domain.

How the malicious code was delivered: injected CDN scripts and a remote payload from 1688360[.]cc

Helme's analysis found attackers had inserted malicious code into Optimizely customer projects so that JavaScript files hosted on Optimizely's content delivery network (CDN) would load a secondary malicious script. BleepingComputer examined modified Optimizely JavaScript files and confirmed the injected code was designed to load an additional script from https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. The injections used multiple techniques: some files referenced the malicious URL directly, others embedded the URL in Base64 and decoded it with JavaScript's atob() function, and at least one variation could execute an embedded copy of the malicious code if the remote script was blocked.

Scope: 178 organizations and numerous household-name websites affected

Helme reported 188 infected Optimizely JavaScript files tied to 178 organizations. BleepingComputer independently confirmed that the malicious script loaded, or attempted to load, on many high-profile sites using scans recorded by urlscan.io. Affected websites that BleepingComputer named include Zoom, KLM, GitLab, BBC, Scheels, CNN, American Girl, ManageBuilding, Smartsheet, Stamps.com, and Salesforce. Other sites listed as impacted include Fox News, Mutual of Omaha, American Eagle, Air France, Change.org, Optimizely itself, HSBC Insurance, Bitly, IG, and UNICEF USA.

Payload capabilities: cryptocurrency hijacking, card skimming, and iOS exploit delivery

Analysis of the track.js payload revealed several distinct malicious capabilities. According to Helme and the examined files, the script:

  • Monitored webpages for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replaced found addresses with attacker-controlled ones to steal transfers.
  • Searched for payment-card data — credit card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes — and attempted to transmit captured information to https://1688360[.]cc/card.php.
  • Loaded additional JavaScript targeting iPhones and iPads; Helme identified the secondary iOS payloads as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, which target different iOS versions.
  • Collected browser cookies, webpage URLs, and screenshots for exfiltration to the attackers.

Helme reported that cryptocurrency wallets embedded in the track.js script received approximately $7,000 in transactions on November 16, indicating the clipboard-hijacking component succeeded in stealing cryptocurrency payments.

Timeline, investigation status, and unanswered access questions

Helme traced the earliest Optimizely script hijackings to early morning on November 16. He also reported cleanup efforts reduced the number of infected scripts dramatically: by 21:52 UTC on November 16 only one of the previously identified 188 files still contained malicious code. It remains unclear how the attackers gained access to modify so many different customer projects — whether through a compromise of Optimizely's infrastructure, stolen credentials, or another method has not been established. BleepingComputer contacted Optimizely for more information and noted it would update the story if a response is received.

What this means for technologists, affected enterprises, and end users

  • Technologists and security teams: will need to search site pages for Optimizely-hosted JavaScript that reference 1688360[.]cc or contain Base64 atob() decoding that resolves to that domain, confirm removal of any residual injected code, and inspect for indicators of card skimming and clipboard replacement behavior.
  • Affected enterprises and procurement leaders: should confirm Optimizely projects and CDN-hosted scripts have been fully cleaned and review how third-party experimentation and personalization scripts are managed and monitored given that customer projects, rather than just a vendor's central service, were modified.
  • End users and the public: should be aware that, according to the examined files, attackers replaced cryptocurrency addresses and attempted to capture payment-card data and that additional iOS-targeting exploit code was served to affected pages.

The immediate cleanup reported by Helme — shrinking the number of infected files from 188 to one within hours on November 16 — curtailed the active reach of the campaign, but the core question remains unresolved: how were so many separate Optimizely projects altered in a single operation? That gap in the record leaves both defenders and customers focused on tracing the access vector and ensuring there are no remaining footholds.

Original story