“I don’t think one can surprise an average Latvian with what Russians are capable of — from our perspective, nothing, literally nothing, they are capable of can make my people overly surprised in terms of what they are trying to achieve,” Airis Rikveilis, the state secretary at Latvia’s Ministry of Defense, said on the sidelines of the AUSA conference in Washington.
Airis Rikveilis’ warning on Russia testing European readiness
Rikveilis told Breaking Defense that Latvia judges a Russian large-scale attack “on a NATO member-state like the one seen in Ukraine in 2022” to be highly unlikely, principally because, in his assessment, Moscow “currently lacks the credible, significant military forces required” for such an operation. Still, he warned that Moscow “would be tempted to test the readiness [of countries] on a smaller-scale,” language that frames Latvian planning around a spectrum of possible hostile actions rather than a single scenario.
Why Riga ties growing migration to security
Rikveilis linked the security concern to what he described as Riga’s “growing troubles with illegal migration.” Latvia shares roughly 276 kilometers (171 miles) of border with Russia and about 161 kilometers (100 miles) with Belarus, and, he said, there have been “nearly 12,000 cases overall of illegal attempts to penetrate into Latvian territory.” He warned that the “profile of that intruder” is worrying because it is “mostly young males in the conscription age — nothing to do in my analysis with a specific need to seek refuge.”

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End the scrambleTunnel crossings and Belsat’s September reporting
Rikveilis singled out underground tunnels as one troubling method of entry. Citing reporting by the Warsaw-based channel Belsat, the source material notes that the first reported illegal border crossing in Latvia using a tunnel occurred on Aug. 10, when authorities found 15 individuals who had crossed from Belarus. A few days later, authorities reportedly discovered a second tunnel through which 28 people crossed from Belarus, and that same day the Latvian State Border Guard reported 109 attempts to cross the border from Belarus.
Latvian national operation: border guard and military cooperation
To respond to the pattern of entries, Rikveilis said Latvia has been conducting a national operation that brings the border guard and the military together, including in search capabilities. He characterized the infiltrations as “organized, orchestrated and professionally led,” and described the tunnels themselves not as simple dug-outs but “quite a professional job.” Those assessments appear to be the basis for tight cooperation between civilian border authorities and the armed forces.
What this means for the Latvian military, the State Border Guard, and NATO partners
- Latvian military: Rikveilis’ remarks frame Latvia’s defence posture around deterrence across a range of possible Russian actions and around practical measures to counter cross-border incursions and clandestine entries; the military is working with the border guard on search capabilities as part of a national operation.
- State Border Guard: The reported discovery of tunnels and the tally of nearly 12,000 illegal-attempt cases place operational pressure on the border service to detect, interdict and investigate crossings that Riga regards as organized and professional in execution.
- NATO partners and European capitals: Riga’s public assessment—that a large-scale assault is unlikely while smaller-scale “tests” of readiness remain possible—frames Latvia’s message to allies as one of vigilance against a range of tactics rather than a single, high-intensity scenario. Moscow, for its part, has dismissed the suggestion that it is a threat.
Rikveilis’ account ties together three concrete threads: a strategic judgment about Russian military capacity, a numerical picture of repeated illegal crossing attempts, and specific incidents involving tunnels that authorities describe as professionally constructed. Those elements explain why Latvian authorities have escalated joint military and border operations even while judging the prospect of a large-scale invasion to be low.
Which specific lines of effort Latvia will prioritize next — further hardening of borders, expanded intelligence and search capabilities, or intensified engagement with allies over “tests” of readiness — is a matter the ministry has framed in public assessments but has not detailed beyond the national operation described by Rikveilis. For now, Riga’s posture is clear: monitor a broad set of tactics, treat organized illegal crossings as security concerns, and keep NATO partners apprised of what it sees as probing behavior.



