"The Tracker tells you that Sichuan University, where Qin was a visiting professor, has defence and security links worth taking seriously," ASPI wrote.
Charles Qin and successive prime ministers
A recent report in The Australian prompted scrutiny of Mandarin–English interpreter Charles Qin and his foreign university affiliations. The Australian reported that Qin holds visiting appointments at Chinese universities that ASPI’s China Defence Universities Tracker rates "very high risk." ASPI notes that successive Australian leaders — "from Bob Hawke to John Howard, Tony Abbott and Anthony Albanese" — have reportedly used the same interpreter, Charles Qin, and that those appearances occurred "in full view of intelligence agencies," a fact ASPI says argues against the notion that his presence is, by itself, a national security problem.
Interpreting roles and bounded exposure
ASPI stresses that an interpreter’s role in a diplomatic meeting is limited and context-dependent. An interpreter confined to the meeting room "hears only what the principals decide to put on the record, in front of the other side, precisely because it is meant to be communicated." By that design, exposure is "bounded": interpreters do not attend preparatory meetings involving strategy, tactics and classified intelligence, and so lack access to the deliberative process behind leaders’ words.
That bounded role, ASPI argues, reduces but does not eliminate risk. Politicians and officials can make remarks when they think the other side has left the room, and the most likely problems arise from misinterpretation or literal translation rather than from deliberate compromise.
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Get a security leadASPI’s China Defence Universities Tracker and institutional risk
ASPI’s Tracker is described as a tool that rates institutions by "the risk of the Chinese government using the relationship for military or security purposes." The Tracker assigns risk to institutions, not to every individual who has lectured or worked there. ASPI recommends that governments, universities and companies use the Tracker as a due-diligence tool "not as an automatic blacklist," to navigate risk rather than avoid engagement entirely.
ASPI draws a distinction between institutional relationships and individual professional relationships. It says that while it would advise an Australian university or a state or federal body against forming agreements with "such a defence-related Chinese organisation" because of systemic risk, that caution "does not necessarily extend to a professional relationship with individuals associated with such organisations, such as visiting professors." The Tracker therefore informs decisions without automatically disqualifying people whose names appear in association with high-risk institutions.
Historical precedents: why interpreters can matter
ASPI marshals historical cases to show when interpreter affiliations have been national security issues. Examples cited include:
- World War II: Gottlieb Fuchs, a Swiss citizen working as an interpreter for the Gestapo commander in occupied France, who was a secret triple agent also working for the French Resistance and Swiss authorities.
- Cold War: a Czech translator recruited by the KGB who infiltrated the CIA until arrest in 1984 for passing secrets to Moscow.
- Second Iraq War: military contractor linguists investigated and prosecuted by the FBI and stripped of fraudulently obtained citizenship after allegations of dual loyalties and theft of classified documents.
- December 2017: Stanislav Yezhov, a personal translator and aide to then Ukrainian prime minister Volodymyr Groysman, arrested for treason after allegedly working for Russian intelligence for years.
ASPI also cites mistranslation cases that show how words alone can alter diplomatic meaning: Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 remark rendered as "We will bury you," and freelance interpreter Steven Seymour’s mistranslations during Jimmy Carter’s 1977 visit to Poland that produced embarrassing and consequential errors.
What this means for DFAT, intelligence agencies, and universities
- DFAT: ASPI suggests DFAT could run a government Mandarin interpretation service "for the prime minister, foreign and defence ministers," employing only interpreters with security clearances and with support from intelligence agencies.
- Intelligence agencies: The current practice, ASPI notes, appears to have accepted Qin’s presence in high-level meetings "in full view of intelligence agencies," implying that risk was assessed and deemed manageable so long as foreign affiliations were disclosed.
- Universities: ASPI recommends using the China Defence Universities Tracker as a due-diligence tool to guide engagement with institutions that have defence and security links, while treating individuals "on their own merits."
ASPI’s central judgment is restrained: interpreters in diplomatic meetings matter, but they are "comparatively low on the spectrum of national security threats." The institute ends with a pointed reminder that translation quality is subordinate to leaders' honesty and actions — "it is more important that Australia prepares for China’s actions, not words" — and that any decision about interpretation should balance institutional risk indicators, individual disclosures, and the bounded nature of the interpreter’s access.
Source: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-prime-ministerial-interpreter-and-interpreting-risk/
