"The Joint Forces have formed a command center south of the city of Mokha, following Houthi breakthroughs across various combat axes under heavy fire," Lt. Gen. Tareq Saleh said in acknowledging the loss of Mokha.
Mokha taken; footage shows fighters inside the port and airport
The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels captured the coastal city of Mokha overnight, according to reporting and multiple social-media posts showing Houthi fighters on the city’s seaport and on the runway of Mokha international airport. Videos and images circulated by outlets and open-source accounts depict seized equipment, including an abandoned M-ATV MRAP. Iranian and Houthi channels posted celebratory footage; IRNA and other accounts published clips of security forces and fighters in the city.
Claims of two island seizures and what is confirmed
TWZ reports the Houthis also reportedly seized two islands that sit in Red Sea shipping lanes: Perim Island, which occupies the narrowest part of the Bab al‑Mandab (BAM) Strait, and Zuqar Island farther north. The article notes that TWZ “cannot independently confirm this.” Perim has an approximately 6,150‑foot runway and facilities visible in 2021 satellite imagery; Zuqar showed runway construction and military emplacements in imagery from 2025. Control of either island would place forces immediately adjacent to commercial shipping routes through the BAM.
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See what we buildWeapons, tactics, and Iranian backing
According to the leader of Saudi‑backed forces who retreated from Mokha, the advance was planned and backed by Iran. The Houthi side, through spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, stated that forces repelled “an enemy combat formation” using “a number of locally manufactured surface-to-air missiles.” Open-source reporting recalls the group’s earlier operational use of drones, uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), anti‑ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and mines; TWZ highlights past incidents, including a kamikaze USV strike on the Greek‑owned ship Tutor in 2024.
Stranglehold on Bab al‑Mandab, shipping disruptions and oil costs
The seizure of Mokha — coupled with Houthi control of Hodeidah to the north — extends the rebels’ reach toward the Bab al‑Mandab chokepoint that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. TWZ notes the group had already imposed a blockade on Saudi oil exports, driving traffic patterns and shipping costs. Lloyd’s List Intelligence reported that traffic through the BAM fell by 15% after the Houthi blockade: 273 ships per week between 27 July and 23 August, down from a weekly average of 319 before the naval ban on Saudi Arabia took effect on 20 July.
The blockade and related strikes are forcing longer voyages and transshipment changes: TWZ cites increased routing through the Suez Canal, heavier use of Hormuz shuttle tankers, and multiple ship‑to‑ship (STS) transfers that tie up capacity and raise delivery costs. Those inefficiencies, Lloyd’s List Intelligence reported, contributed to a third spike in VLCC spot rates since the crisis began. Oil prices have moved sharply: TWZ reports Brent Crude trading above $107 per barrel at noon on the Thursday cited, and notes the per‑barrel price had earlier passed the $100 mark.
U.S. and regional military strain
TWZ frames the Mokha capture against broader regional pressure. The article says the U.S. is “stretched thin” by operations focused on Iran and argues that re‑engaging as it did in a previous Red Sea campaign would draw forces away from other priorities. CBS News is cited for reporting damage to U.S. Air Force jets after an Iranian missile barrage on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, with one A‑10 losing a wing and several F‑15E fighters sustaining slight damage. Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao is quoted as saying Iranian forces “blew the hell out of Bahrain,” where U.S. facilities including the Fifth Fleet headquarters are located, and the Wall Street Journal is cited for reporting that Iranian missiles have come closer to striking U.S. warships, including an aircraft carrier.
Regional transit through the Strait of Hormuz has also been affected: Reuters reported transits fell to seven on a recent day from 12 the day before, below a 10‑day average of 14, with the caveat that some ships may be transiting with transponders turned off and thus not counted.
What this means for maritime operators, policymakers, and Saudi energy shippers
- Maritime operators: Watch for the expanded use of drones, USVs, mines and booby‑trapped boats—tools TWZ says the Houthis have operationalized—and for evidence of island‑based surveillance or launch points that could shorten reaction times for attacks on transits through the BAM.
- Policymakers and military planners: Expect pressure to reallocate naval and air assets if protection of Red Sea shipping is prioritized, a point TWZ raises given U.S. forces are described as “overstretched” and regionally engaged against Iran.
- Saudi energy shippers and logistics managers: Monitor diversions to Yanbu and the increased need for shuttles and STS transfers that Lloyd’s List Intelligence links to higher transport costs and VLCC rate volatility, and which TWZ ties to the ongoing blockade of Saudi exports.
The facts reported by TWZ sketch a rapid tactical win for the Houthis and a broader strategic headache for regional and global actors: a newly seized port, claims of island control at the mouth of the Red Sea, an already active toolkit of drones, missiles and USVs, and rising shipping and oil costs. The salient, immediate question the reporting leaves in plain view is whether those who have the resources and the will can or will break that chokehold — and at what cost, to ships, to oil markets, and to forces already committed elsewhere.
Source: TWZ — Houthis’ Stranglehold On Strategic Bab Al‑Mandab Strait Grows Stronger
