“The first really remembered occurrence of this due to all the noise it later caused was ‘SolarWinds Orion’ that we believe was first active at or before September 2019.”
SolarWinds Orion as a reference point for supply‑chain risk
The source uses the SolarWinds Orion intrusion — believed to have been active at or before September 2019 — as the watershed moment that crystallized a broader worry: that third‑party code and software supply chains can be subverted to provide sustained, trusted access. That event is cited not as a singular North Korean problem but as an example of how an outside actor, once introduced into a vendor’s build and signing pipeline, can undermine trust in code signing and other supply‑chain controls.
Researchers and a fake start‑up: studying fraudulent North Korean IT workers
Researchers set up a fake start‑up company to study fraudulent North Korean IT workers. That experiment is cited alongside commentary that the “North Korean” label often becomes a banner issue that narrows corporate thinking about supply‑chain attacks. The post argues this framing can make companies presume the problem is limited to one nationality rather than seeing a broader threat surface.
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See what we build“Once these workers clear hiring, they’re inside your network with legitimate access” — insider threat
As Rontea notes, this is an insider threat. The piece points out that login credentials taken from legitimate employees are valuable long after a particular hired operative leaves a firm; they provide a persistent foothold. It adds that when spies are caught working inside a company, “there needs to be a detailed review and changing all logins would be likely needed.” The post also recalls that years ago an American was prosecuted for providing laptops to a North Korean laptop farm — an example that underlines how non‑technical facilitators can materially enable espionage operations.
Agencies, code signing, and the broader labor supply chain
The note warns that hiring organisations are often not standalone: many workers are supplied through agencies that place personnel inside other companies’ software “supply chains.” That, the author argues, is “a very easy way to blow ‘code signing’ out of the water and render it completely useless yet ‘fully trusted’.” The post recalls a discussion between the author and @NickP on a blog roughly a decade and a half ago, observing that the problem of intermediate suppliers introducing risk has been understood for many years.
How technologists and security teams, corporate managers, and researchers are affected
- Technologists and security teams: They are reminded that credentials and legitimate, hired-access are the core risk. The post recommends a “detailed review” and likely changing of logins if spies are discovered, and directs practitioners to an interview‑question test hosted at this.weekinsecurity.com that the author says can expose North Korean spies during online hiring.
- Corporate management and procurement leaders: The author criticises business incentives — asserting that hiring foreign IT workers can “stop citizens in that country developing needed ‘national skills’” while generating short‑term profit that keeps shareholders placated and managers’ bonuses intact. The post also notes that management’s enthusiasm for AI has often proven misplaced: “AI really does not pay or play well,” delivering long‑term ROI only in very niche areas with experienced human oversight.
- Researchers and defenders studying fraudulent workers: The use of a fake start‑up to surface hiring fraud demonstrates a practical research method and highlights a tension the author sees in public messaging: emphasising a nationality (North Korean) can distract from the wider category of fraudulent or adversary‑enabled hires coming through global supply chains.
The source stresses a consistent theme: the nationality of a hired worker can be a convenient headline, but the operational problem is broader and older than any single actor. Login theft, agency‑supplied placements, and compromised code‑signing pipelines are concrete mechanisms that let a few individuals or small teams cause outsized, long‑lasting access. The practical steps signalled by the piece — rigorous post‑discovery reviews, credential rotation, and interview screening — are narrow but tangible responses to that reality.
