Democracies Urged to Form Global Alliance to Deter China

"There is a distinct possibility of an enormous war breaking out in the next few years over a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan." — the article

A 20-year democratic reversal and the shock of 2022

The article frames the danger in large historical terms: over the past 20 years "autocracy" has advanced while "democracy" has retreated, a trend attributed to Freedom House. That arc of democratic erosion is not abstract in the piece — it says it helps set the international context in which kinetic confrontation becomes likelier.

Two concrete developments followed. First, Russia in 2022 launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an act that "galvanised the West into action" and produced arms support "most recently via the ‘coalition of the willing’." Second, the security map of Europe shifted: Finland joined NATO in 2023 and Sweden in 2024. The article notes the EU itself has been discussing how to "beef up its communal defence and security forces." These moves are offered as both reaction and precedent for the kind of allied response the author envisions in Asia.

Beijing's posture: South China Sea, Taiwan, and a 2027 timetable

China's behavior in the region provides the proximate cause for alarm in the article. It says Chinese President Xi Jinping "is trying to control the South China Sea" and that China is "building up its armed forces for taking control of Taiwan as fast as possible." The piece cites a specific intelligence-derived benchmark: "Xi has told the armed forces to be ready to go by 2027, according to US intelligence." It also warns that if China acts, "the US may well respond militarily, possibly with Japanese, Philippine and Australian help," and that any such war could broaden unpredictably — even, in the author's words, to the point that "with Russian involvement, it might be a third world war."

Why a global alliance of democracies, and what it would look like

The central prescription of the article is institutional: form "an alliance of democracies" — a united front able to deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression. The argument rests on an arithmetic claim drawn from the piece: "the major democracies have more than half the world’s GDP and around two-thirds of global military spending." United, the article says, those democracies "should be enough to overawe and deter the autocracies" and, in the worst case, to prevail on the battlefield.

The article notes that democracies are already knitting closer ties: the Quad (India, Japan, Australia, United States) and AUKUS (Australia, Britain, United States) are cited as existing architectures. It also records that "Japan has strongly increased defence spending and has formed new defence cooperation agreements with the US and Australia," and that the EU has created security and defence partnerships with Japan, South Korea and Australia. These steps are presented as building blocks toward a broader, formalized alliance.

The D7 proposal and the idea of a world security community

For an initial institutional core the article highlights a proposal advanced by Anders Fogh Rasmussen and referenced in a January World Economic Forum address by Mark Carney. Rasmussen proposes a D7 grouping composed of "the EU plus Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea." He envisions the D7 beginning "as merely an informal group along the lines of the G7," focusing on shared interests, and potentially "eventually develop[ing] into a broader security partnership among middle powers."

The article suggests a pathway: the D7 could "agree quite soon to create a formal alliance of democracies by means of a treaty," with that treaty later opened to other democracies and "the US would ideally join as soon as possible." An even more ambitious model is proposed — a "world security community of democratic nations following the European model," which would handle mutual defence along with shared approaches to trade, climate policy and other global problems.

What this means for Japan, Australia, and middle‑power democracies

• Japan: The article records Japan "has strongly increased defence spending" and entered new defence cooperation agreements with the US and Australia; as such, Japan is presented as an active mover toward deeper security alignment in the region.
• Australia: Listed as a partner in both the Quad and AUKUS, Australia is depicted as an existing participant in the emerging security architecture and a potential anchor for a middle‑power treaty grouping.
• Middle‑power democracies (D7 members): The article argues these states — the EU members collectively plus Canada, Britain, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea — could form the nucleus of a treaty-based alliance that could be opened to other democracies and, over time, evolve into a broader security community.

The piece is unambiguous in its central claim: given the risks the author describes — from democratic backsliding to a potential Chinese campaign against Taiwan — a new, treaty‑based alliance of democracies is the preferred deterrent. The concrete next step the article proposes is starting small, with middle powers in a D7 framework, drafting a treaty, and inviting enlargement, with the United States joining "as soon as possible." Whether those diplomatic, political and military pieces can be assembled in time is the question the article leaves in stark relief.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/to-deter-china-we-need-a-global-alliance-of-democracies/