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Threat IntelligenceEmerging Threats

Com-affiliated Threat Actors Escalate Vishing Attacks on Data-Rich Industries

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"We have responded to numerous data theft and extortion attempts that we have attributed to Bling Libra and other Com-affiliated threat actors."

How these Com-affiliated campaigns gain a foothold

Unit 42's telemetry and incident response work trace a consistent entry vector: vishing. Operators pose as internal IT support and direct employees to organization-specific subdomains that host adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) proxies. Those proxies capture credentials and session tokens in real time, allowing attackers to bypass or replay multi-factor authentication (MFA) prompts and enroll unauthorized MFA devices within minutes.

Attackers route into victim environments through residential proxy networks and commercial VPNs, then rely heavily on native cloud utilities and scripted API access rather than bespoke malware. Unit 42 observed scripted exfiltration using Python tooling (python-httpx and python-requests/2.34.2) and the Microsoft Graph SDK (Microsoft.Graph.Client/6.2.0) to pull data from Microsoft 365 mailboxes, OneDrive and SharePoint.

Two new clusters: CL-CRI-1264 (Vortex) and CL-CRI-1274 (Cinder)

In September 2026 Unit 42 identified CL-CRI-1264 and CL-CRI-1274. CL-CRI-1264 primarily targeted healthcare, pharmaceuticals and medical organizations and repeatedly used vishing to set up AiTM proxies. Investigators saw the attackers enroll the same unauthorized MFA device — a device labeled Pixel 10a — across compromised accounts, and automate exfiltration with Python scripts that used a python-httpx User Agent.

CL-CRI-1274 used a persistent "keep me signed in" session token, replaying it from proxy infrastructure to avoid re-prompting Duo MFA. That cluster also relied on scripted collection via python-requests/2.34.2 and the Microsoft Graph SDK, then used compromised accounts to send extortion messages over email and Microsoft Teams that directed victims to Tor-hosted negotiation sites.

CL-CRI-1192 / UNC6671 and a malicious browser extension

During an investigation attributed to CL-CRI-1192 (which Google tracks under UNC6671), Unit 42 uncovered a malicious browser extension masquerading as "Google Chrome" (manifest version 1.6.111) and a sibling file (version 1.6.112). Neither was on the Chrome Web Store; both were hosted on an attacker-controlled server at oskeysetup[.]com (31.42.184[.]213).

Unit 42 found each extension installed global keyloggers, stole local/session storage and IndexedDB data, harvested authentication cookies for Microsoft and Google accounts, scanned pages for QR codes to capture login/MFA tokens, streamed webcam feeds, and included a full command-and-control module via chrome.debugger for remote control (screenshots, synthetic input, clipboard theft, remote navigation). The two files share a hard-coded API key; Palo Alto Networks published SHA-256 hashes for these files and the hosting URLs.

Victimology: who the attackers sought and where

From August through October 2026 Unit 42 observed persistent campaigns that shifted in target focus. In August attackers targeted financial services about twice as often as healthcare; by September, healthcare overtook financial services — coinciding with CL-CRI-1264 activity — and remained highly targeted in October alongside financial firms. Attackers focused on roles and systems holding high-impact corporate data: legal and corporate strategy documents, private investment records, CRM and recruiting databases, patient records and proprietary life sciences research.

Geographically, most targeted organizations were in the U.S. between August and October 2026, but targeting of Australian organizations rose sharply in late September — from under 1% of observed subdomains in August and September to about 13% in October, making Australia the second most-targeted country in Unit 42's dataset. Target profiles commonly included distributed workforces, centralized single sign-on (SSO), and extensive cloud collaboration platforms.

What this means for technologists, regulators, and healthcare, legal, and financial firms

  • Technologists and security teams: Unit 42 recommends tightening help desk verification, implementing browser extension allowlists, establishing visibility into identity actions, and alerting on unauthorized data exports. The report highlights moving to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) as a critical defensive step.
  • Regulators and compliance officers: attackers explicitly threaten regulatory reporting and broadcast extortion notices across internal chat channels to maximize pressure. Unit 42 also notes recent arrests of suspected Bling Libra members (named in reporting as “Rey” and “Umbreon”) and of a person alleged to have run Bling Libra’s extortion site — a reminder that law enforcement activity is converging with criminal operations.
  • Healthcare, legal and financial firms: these sectors were primary targets for data theft with high regulatory, legal and market impact. Unit 42 observed repeat targeting of the same organizations, automated exfiltration of cloud-hosted research and patient records, and the use of compromised accounts to internalize extortion messaging.

Unit 42's findings underline a broader shift in extortion tradecraft: operators are moving away from disruptive encryption-based ransomware toward faster, identity- and cloud-focused theft and extortion. The clusters, tooling, and domain patterns described — from AiTM kits and Doko's Panel variants to the long list of SSO- and passkey-themed apex domains Unit 42 tracks — make clear that attackers are optimizing for speed, credential capture, and cloud-native exfiltration as they head into 2027.

Read the full Unit 42 report here: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/com-affiliate-vishing-attacks/