"for the positive, for good and for humanity," President Xi Jinping told delegates at the World AI Conference and High‑Level Meeting on Global AI Governance on 17 July 2026.
President Xi Jinping’s 17 July speech at the World AI Conference
Xi used the conference platform to argue for a "people‑centered approach," describing AI as "an important driver for shared prosperity and common security" and urging states to join hands "to build a just and equitable system for global AI governance." He framed his remarks around four points: promoting openness, collaboration and sharing; recognising AI risks and the need for human control; encouraging inclusiveness and mutual learning between civilisations; and backing multilateral, United Nations‑centred consensus for new global rules and technical standards.
World AI Cooperation Organization and the 29 founding signatories
On 16 July, China announced the establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization, and 29 countries became founding signatories. The source lists Pakistan, Russia, Malaysia and Indonesia among those signatories. Beijing presented the new body as a practical vehicle to facilitate international cooperation on AI governance and development, though the article notes that the organisation's long‑term influence remains to be seen.
China’s pitch to the Global South: training, centres and appeals to capacity building
Much of Xi’s address and prior messaging has been directed at the Global South. He pledged that in the next five years China would assist developing countries "with 5,000 opportunities in AI training and seminar programs" and would "develop international AI application cooperation centers" with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS. The article stresses that these offers are attractive to nations seeking to bridge digital divides, but it warns those states not to mistake capacity assistance for neutral norm‑setting.
Critics’ reading: access needs, securitisation and exported norms
The piece argues China’s international rhetoric is "largely self‑serving." Singapore Management University law professor Henry Gao is quoted saying China "wants access to global models, talent, chips, research, open‑source ecosystems and technical knowledge because that is what it needs at this stage." Alexander Evans, former cyber head at Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is cited observing that China needs cooperation because "no country has complete vertical control."
The article also highlights a political dimension: Xi’s stated opposition to "overstretching the national security concept in the field of AI" is portrayed as a rebuttal to US restrictions on Chinese access to American AI technology. That claim is set against the reminder that Beijing has itself securitised domains such as trade, data, finance, markets and rare earths to create national advantages. The author warns China seeks to export "responsible norms, rules and standards" that will not necessarily respect universal human or political rights, arguing that allowing "China, an illiberal, authoritarian and aggressive great power with a penchant for centralisation and hegemony, to determine the rules for AI governance is likely to be dangerous everywhere, including in the Global South."
The article places the AI effort in context with China’s wider technology exports — naming 5G network gear, drones, smart cars and renewable‑energy equipment — and cautions democracies against letting those export patterns repeat in AI.
What this means for democracies, the Global South, and multilateral organisations
- Democracies: The article delivers a direct admonition — "democracies need to get their act together" — urging liberal powers to collectively strengthen AI governance and promote ethical, responsible use before China can "write the global AI rulebook."
- The Global South: Nations offered training and cooperation will gain capacity but must weigh that assistance against potential adoption of norms that do not safeguard universal rights, the article warns.
- Multilateral organisations and regional blocs: Bodies such as the United Nations, ASEAN, the African Union and BRICS are identified as targets for China’s cooperation centres and diplomatic outreach; the article notes uptake is not guaranteed, pointing to past examples where Chinese‑led governance initiatives did not attract broad support.
The immediate fact pattern is simple: China has mounted a visible diplomatic offensive around AI governance — new institutions, pledges of training and a high‑profile speech — while critics say the effort serves Beijing’s strategic need for access and influence. The article closes with a stark admonition that Xi’s appeals should "sound the tocsin" to liberal powers to act now and collectively on governance, rather than conceding the emerging global rules to Beijing.
Source: Keep an eye on China’s AI governance offensive — The Strategist (ASPI)
