"Australia living in ‘the most dangerous times’ that we have faced since the end of World War II," Defence Minister Richard Marles has said — a phrase that frames the argument running through this assessment of strategic warning and preparedness.
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the end of the 10‑year warning
Before 2020, Australian defence planning rested on an assumption that Canberra would have at least 10 years' warning of an impending war, time to expand the Australian Defence Force and make necessary preparations. That planning assumption was upended in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update released by the Morrison government in July 2020, and the Albanese government has retained the same conclusion: Australia can no longer rely on a decade of warning. That shift underpins repeated ministerial references to heightened peril and reframes the nation's planning horizon.
Why China is treated as the single credible regional threat
The assessment is explicit: leaving aside China, no regional power could credibly threaten Australia without first building up military power — a process that would be detectable and allow hedging. The only credible regional source of large‑scale threat identified in the analysis is an aggressive and unchecked China, especially if conflict between China and the United States were to break out, as former prime minister Kevin Rudd recently suggested could occur over Taiwan. Were a US–China war to erupt, the paper argues, Australia would very likely be drawn in because of its strategically crucial geography.
The piece lays out multiple possible Chinese approaches short of, or leading to, a full‑scale invasion of Taiwan: seizures of offshore islands, blockades or quarantines, limited wars elsewhere (for example against the Philippines), and other operational strategies sequenced in different ways. Deception and plausible cover, including large‑scale military exercises, could be used to mask preparations for surprise operations; in a Taiwan scenario, allied forces might need up to 28 days to arrive in strength. The article notes that even vigilant states can be surprised — citing Israel in October 2023 — and so warns that denial of warning cannot be assumed.
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See what we buildIntelligence architecture: ONI, Kathy Klugman, and the national assessments board
Under the ONI Act 2018 the director‑general of the Office of National Intelligence (ONI) — Kathy Klugman — has statutory independence in preparing assessments. By law she is not subject to direction about the content or conclusions of any ONI report. The director‑general chairs a national assessments board that must be consulted when preparing a national assessment; core membership includes the departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, Home Affairs and the Treasury, together with the Australian Defence Force, and other agencies as required.
National assessments are highly classified and, the paper stresses, "very few in government ever see such assessments and they are never seen outside government." The legal framework requires members to try to reach agreement; if they cannot, the director‑general must give a statement to each recipient setting out any difference of opinion. The article frames this as a formal protection for officials to surface contesting views without political interference.
The 2024 Independent Intelligence Review and the need for full‑time warning teams
The 2024 Independent Intelligence Review, released by the government in March 2025, identified gaps in Australia's strategic warning function and made recommendations aimed at improvement. The paper reports it is not clear those recommendations have been enacted. To strengthen warning, the author proposes establishing full‑time warning teams focused on indicators of readiness changes in China, listing specific signals to watch for:
- key military units moving into place;
- signs of national mobilisation;
- increased defence production and stockpiling;
- economic measures such as a rapid sell‑off of US securities and the hoarding of gold;
- preparatory moves in cyberspace and space;
- changes in the content and intensity of Chinese discourse intended to lay out a case for the use of force.
The author draws lessons from the literature on warning failures — Pearl Harbor (December 1941), the invasion of South Korea (June 1950), the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962), the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) — and cites Keren Yarhi‑Milo’s work on leaders' heuristics to underline how decision‑makers can discount intelligence when it conflicts with their beliefs or political calculations.
What this means for Kathy Klugman, the prime minister, and the Australian people
Kathy Klugman, as director‑general of ONI, holds the statutory remit to prepare the national assessment that would grapple with how to judge Xi’s calculations, especially regarding Taiwan; the law protects her independence in doing so. If such an assessment exists, the article urges Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to "do his duty and make a sober and measured statement to the House of Representatives" so parliament and the public know what may lie ahead; at minimum, the public has a right to know that an assessment exists or is being prepared.
If no assessment exists, the article argues the prime minister should direct one be prepared (without directing its content), or the secretaries committee on national security — chaired by the secretary of PM&C — should recommend that such an assessment be prepared urgently. The piece warns that if a future conflict revealed that widely available warning had been ignored, Australians would demand a level of accountability deeper than a royal commission.
From the outside, and without access to "exquisite intelligence," the author concludes we may face "nerve‑racking crises as early as 2028," with a major war the least likely scenario. The final appeal is both procedural and moral: let our intelligence analysts be fearless and analytically brilliant, and let political leaders heed and act on their warnings.
