On August 13, Jamf warned that a new macOS infostealer—written in Rust and dubbed AmnesiaStealer—is being distributed through ClickFix social‑engineering attacks against Mac users.
How ClickFix lures deliver AmnesiaStealer
Jamf’s analysis traces AmnesiaStealer back to a familiar social‑engineering pattern known as ClickFix. In these attacks a counterfeit GitHub download page presents a “Terminal installation” box and numbered steps that encourage an advanced user to copy and paste a command into macOS Terminal. If the user clicks a copy button, the page produces a base64 blob that decodes into a single command. That command fetches a short, silent, self‑deleting script which, in turn, executes the AmnesiaStealer binary.
The ClickFix tactic succeeds because the copy‑and‑paste action is often treated as legitimate by anti‑virus and other cyber defenses: Jamf explains that the method “bypasses many anti‑virus and cyber defense tools” by relying on users to run the command themselves. Jamf also notes that research has shown ClickFix has become a leading means of malware delivery in 2026.
Multi‑stage infection: reconnaissance, credential capture and exfiltration
Once executed, AmnesiaStealer follows a series of stages and objectives. The binary first performs reconnaissance across software, hardware and display data types. It then harvests data from applications including Apple Notes and Telegram, taking care to write commands that avoid triggering macOS’ TCC permission prompts.
The malware subsequently prompts the victim to enter their password; that password is validated locally and then used to unlock data‑protection keychain files that contain encrypted records. Jamf’s researchers state that “at the time of analysis, it is not clear why these records are collected.” Collected items are staged into a directory, archived and then exfiltrated off the victim device.
To reduce audible evidence of file duplication during collection, AmnesiaStealer first ‘mutes’ the device’s sound system, because some of its data collection operates through Finder, which plays a sound for each duplicated file.
The cyber insurance questionnaire just landed. Now what?
SOC 2, HIPAA, insurance renewals - someone has to own security strategy. Nubivance provides fractional CISO leadership without the full-time salary.
Get a security leadRemote browser control: cloning profiles and live screencast access
AmnesiaStealer’s second stage is a remotely controlled module that gives operators hidden, interactive control of victims’ browsers. The module supports seven Chromium‑family browsers: Chrome, Brave, Microsoft Edge, Arc, Opera, Vivaldi and Chromium. Before taking control, the module clones the victim profile and operates on the copy so the visible browser session remains unchanged to the user.
From that cloned profile the operator receives a live screencast and can drive the session with full input capabilities: keyboard, mouse, scroll, navigation and tab management. The module also steals browser cookie data in plaintext over the DevTools protocol. To evade detection by visited sites, it injects a script designed to keep the session from being flagged as automation.
macOS‑specific stealth and patched bypasses
Jamf highlights macOS‑specific capabilities that make AmnesiaStealer novel compared with other macOS infostealers such as Atomic (AMOS), MacSync and CrashStealer. The malware includes OS version‑branched logic that attempts macOS bypasses that, the researchers say, have been patched by Apple. That version‑aware branching and the sound‑muting behavior are cited as examples of the operator’s focus on stealth during collection and execution.
What this means for macOS users, security teams and browser operators
- macOS users: The ClickFix delivery relies on convincing users to paste and run Terminal commands. Jamf’s advisory underscores the risk of self‑remediation behaviours and shows how a simple copy‑and‑paste can start a multi‑stage compromise.
- Security teams and defenders: AmnesiaStealer combines local credential prompting, TCC‑aware collection, and profile cloning to bypass visual indicators and make detection difficult. Jamf recommends configuring threat prevention, advanced threat controls and web protection to “Block and Report” to help prevent execution of similar threats.
- Browser vendors and operators: The module’s use of the DevTools protocol to exfiltrate plaintext cookies and its injection of anti‑automation scripts point to the need for scrutiny of profile‑cloning and DevTools access patterns when investigating suspicious sessions.
AmnesiaStealer demonstrates how a modest initial trick—an apparently convenient Terminal installation prompt on a cloned GitHub page—can escalate into a layered, stealthy campaign that harvests notes, messaging data, keychain‑protected records and live browser sessions. Jamf’s findings close a clear loop from social engineering to deep, browser‑based session theft and leave a concrete recommendation: configure prevention and web controls to Block and Report. The report was published on August 13.
