"On launch, the NSIS-based installer executable dropped a file named '7z.dll' into a temporary directory and ran it through rundll32.exe," Kaspersky said in an analysis published today.
How the patched 7z.dll installs CoffeeLoader
Kaspersky's analysis describes an installer that abuses a legitimate library name—7z.dll—by dropping a patched version into a temporary folder and invoking it via rundll32.exe. That patched library is not merely a modified archive utility: "Part of its code had been replaced with malicious self-decrypting shellcode that turned out to be a new version of the Armoury packer," Kaspersky said. The packer extracts intermediate shellcode that acts as a downloader for the main CoffeeLoader payload; the final loader is either injected into a process or written to disk and executed, depending on commands it receives from its command-and-control (C2) server.
Armoury packer evolution: OpenCL replaced with OpenGL, downloader shellcode
CoffeeLoader's earlier variants—first documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in March 2025—used the Armoury packer and ran Rhadamanthys shellcode, sharing source code similarities with the SmokeLoader family. Kaspersky notes the new packer continues to leverage GPU-accelerated decryption, but makes a clear technical shift: the older packer executed decryption routines via the OpenCL library; the new variant uses OpenGL. The packer also now delivers intermediate shellcode rather than a DLL, and that shellcode downloads the CoffeeLoader payload from hard-coded C2 addresses.

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Get coveragePersistence, autorun protection, and process injection techniques
Persistence is established by copying the malicious 7z.dll into subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% and registering it under the Run registry key. Subfolder, library, and registry entry names are created from eight hexadecimal digits generated from system volume information. To make removal harder, the downloader "creates a registry key that prevents the user from disabling autorun through Task Manager," Kaspersky said. For execution, the malware launches legitimate Windows processes—examples named by Kaspersky include dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe, and AtBroker.exe—and injects its shellcode into them. The shellcode supports three commands to run next-stage malware: inject into a process; save to disk as an executable and run it; or save as a DLL and execute via rundll32.exe.
Retadup worm reactivation and distribution chain
Distribution of CoffeeLoader in this campaign occurred through Retadup, a Windows worm that spreads via infected USB drives and that French law enforcement disrupted in August 2019. Historically Retadup has been observed dropping a range of payloads, including cryptocurrency miners, the Stop ransomware, and the Arkei password stealer. Two years ago, according to Kaspersky, threat actors began re-registering the domain names Retadup had used as C2 servers and issuing commands to download third-party malware. Initially those servers delivered SmokeLoader packed with a 32-bit Armoury; in early 2025, the same servers started serving CoffeeLoader.
What this means for technologists, affected enterprises, and end users
- Technologists and security teams: watch for indicators tied to the patched 7z.dll, the eight-hex-digit naming convention based on system volume information, and network connections to domains historically associated with Retadup's C2 infrastructure. The change to an OpenGL-based decryption routine and delivery of intermediate shellcode are specific technical signals to hunt for in malware analysis and detection rules.
- Affected enterprises and procurement leaders: the worm's USB-driven distribution and the demonstrated ability to resurrect old C2 domains mean legacy systems and removable-media policies remain relevant. Kaspersky reported it blocked around 15,000 systems from being infected by the resurrected worm, with the majority of those systems located in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia—geographic patterns that may inform incident response prioritization.
- End users and administrators: the malware's use of common Windows binaries (dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe, AtBroker.exe) for injection, plus registry keys that prevent disabling autorun, are concrete behaviors to monitor and remediate when discovered.
It remains unclear whether the original Retadup author reactivated the worm's infrastructure or whether other threat actors repurposed the domains. Kaspersky's blocking of roughly 15,000 attempted infections highlights both the scale of the campaign and an open question: who is standing behind the revived C2 infrastructure and what other loaders or payloads those servers might serve next.




