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Pentagon Leverages Polygraphs to Hunt Leakers, Despite Dubious Science

Polygraph machine with sensors and electrodes sits in a neutral-colored government office.

In August, government investigators subjected roughly 50 military officers and civilian employees on the Joint Staff to polygraph tests as part of an inquiry into press leaks about the Iran war and depleted U.S. munitions, a scope The New York Times described as unprecedented in the modern military.

August Joint Staff polygraph campaign

The use of polygraphs on the Joint Staff in August represents a notable escalation in how the Pentagon is trying to find sources of press leaks. The tests were conducted as part of inquiries tied to reporting on the Iran war and on shortages of U.S. munitions. The New York Times described the scale of this particular investigation as unprecedented in the modern military, and the action follows broader patterns of intensified leak investigations across government since 2025.

How polygraphs work — and what the science says

Polygraphs measure physiological responses such as heart rate, blood pressure and perspiration on the premise that deceptive answers produce characteristic spikes. The author of the source calls polygraphs “pseudo‑scientific,” noting that no specific physiological reactions are reliably associated with lying. Major reviews — the National Academy of Sciences in 2003, the American Psychological Association in 2004 and a 2019 assessment — have concluded that polygraph testing rests more on theater than on fact. As a result, polygraph results are not generally admissible in U.S. courts; only a handful of states, including Georgia, Arizona and California, permit their use under limited conditions that typically require agreement by both parties and a judge’s approval.

Polygraphs inside national security hiring and leak hunts

Within national security agencies, however, polygraphs remain central to vetting. The source’s author — who reports taking roughly a dozen polygraphs over a 27‑year CIA career and overseeing personnel vetting — describes how tests function more as a screening filter than a forensic proof. Examiners’ readings of elevated reactions have halted clearances after questions about past drug use or foreign contacts, even when no disqualifying behavior was documented. In other cases, an examiner’s suggestion that a chart shows an anomaly has prompted applicants to volunteer previously undisclosed details — minor infractions, undeclared relationships, or casual drug use from decades earlier — reshaping how their trustworthiness is perceived. The author summarizes the polygraph’s operational power bluntly: it often creates the conditions under which deception is confessed.

Political patterns: 2025 directives, agency practices, and reopened cases

The current campaign at the Pentagon is part of a broader pattern. The source notes that the Trump administration in 2025 directed a wave of tests across the executive branch aimed at exposing minor leaks. At agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, polygraphs reportedly have been used frequently and, according to the source, more punitively to identify internal dissenters. The author also documents institutional moves at the Pentagon that affect the press: policies now restrict unescorted press access, revoke office space for major outlets and favor ideologically aligned networks. Even past leak investigations have been reopened; “cold cases,” including the leak of the Supreme Court’s Dobbs opinion, were pursued again despite prior probes yielding no definitive source. Historical leak inquiries cited by the source include the 2003 exposure of CIA officer Valerie Plame’s identity — which led to the conviction of White House aide Scooter Libby for perjury, later commuted — and the 2010 disclosures by Chelsea Manning.

What this means for the Joint Staff, the press, and investigators

  • Joint Staff: The polygraph campaign may reduce unauthorized disclosures but is likely to have a chilling effect on internal candor and could divert investigative energy from operational priorities.
  • The press: Pentagon policies described in the source — restricting unescorted access and revoking office space for major outlets while favoring certain networks — tighten the practical relationship between reporters and military sources.
  • Investigators and leadership: Polygraphs can serve as a screening tool that produces confessions or admissions, but scientific reviews and experience reported by the author suggest the tests are imprecise; relying on them risks pursuing leads that do not materially improve security while eroding morale.

Artificial intelligence is sometimes proposed as a future tool to detect deception, but the source cautions that such technology is “nowhere near operational readiness.” For now, institutions must contend with the imperfect instruments they have: polygraphs that are more theatrical than forensic, and enforcement choices that can protect secrets at the expense of internal trust and adaptability. The Pentagon’s recent polygraph campaign may find a few leak sources, but the source argues it will not eliminate leaks and may carry longer‑term costs for institutional resilience.

Read the original Defense One piece