Iraq took in 5,700 ISIS‑affiliated prisoners — not only Iraqis and Syrians, but residents of 61 other countries — after the SDF’s January collapse in northeast Syria.
U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Syria
The U.S. military has completed its withdrawals from Iraq and Syria, ending a decade of American leadership in the counter‑ISIS fight, Caroline D. Rose and Dr. Julie Chernov Hwang write. The drawdown reduces costs and risks to U.S. personnel, but it also removed a forward posture that provided intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), airpower, special operations capacity, logistics, and local partnerships.
According to the authors, the absence of that footprint “diminishes visibility into ISIS networks, undermines security relationships, and eliminates a forward position from which Washington could detect and disrupt terrorist threats before they affect U.S. interests and foreign partners.”
ISIS' shifting tactics: attacks in June and July
While ISIS has mounted fewer attacks in Iraq and Syria since 2025, the authors interpret this as strategic recalibration rather than decline. In Syria, the group has diversified its targets and methods. In one June reporting window, ISIS attacked oil tankers, commercial trucks, security checkpoints, military regional headquarters, political figures, judges, and buses ferrying personnel from the Ministry of Defense.
In July, a bomb killed 10 people at a Damascus café frequented by officials working in the Justice Palace. Two more bombs exploded during President Macron of France’s first state visit: one that killed 10 people near the Four Seasons Hotel and another that killed 18 near the Ministry of Tourism. Those incidents illustrate the geographic and target expansion the authors describe.
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End the scrambleDetention, prison breaks, and the post‑SDF landscape
Counterterrorism infrastructure is fraying, the authors warn. The dissolution of the Counter‑ISIS mission and the emptying of detention camps such as Al Hol and Al Roj are cited as evidence of erosion. Overcrowded, under‑resourced prisons now hold large numbers of suspects; the 5,700 detainees transferred to Iraq after the SDF collapse strained facilities that were already fragile.
The piece recalls ISIS’ historical use of prison breaks to restore ranks — citing the “Breaking the Walls” campaign of 2012–13 in Iraq — and notes recent breakout attempts and attacks on detention facilities: ISIS’ 2022 attack on Al Sinaa prison and a January attempt at the Shaddadi detention facility in northeastern Syria.
Regional cooperation required: Jordan, Türkiye, Lebanon, Damascus, and Baghdad
Rose and Chernov Hwang stress that Iraq, Syria, and their neighbors must now replace the effects of the U.S. presence through regional cooperation. They call specifically on Jordan, Türkiye, Lebanon and other regional players to forge close relationships with Damascus and Baghdad so that counterterrorism efforts are sustained collectively rather than collapsing into isolated national efforts.
The authors warn that without such cooperation, “the region risks losing years of counterterrorism progress—and the U.S. may be forced to intercede once again.”
What this means for Washington, Baghdad and Damascus, and Jordan, Türkiye, and Lebanon
- Washington: Loses forward detection and disruption capabilities supplied by troops and partners; must identify “creative ways to fill the security gaps” left by the withdrawal.
- Baghdad and Damascus: Are the custodians of large, complex detention populations and now bear responsibility for detention, interrogation, and trial; both face real concerns about backsliding and whether domestic forces can integrate effectively to sustain ISIS’ defeat.
- Jordan, Türkiye, and Lebanon: Need to build closer ties with Baghdad and Damascus to preserve regional counterterrorism gains and to prevent proxy militias, malign actors, and terrorist organizations from exploiting gaps.
The facts sketched by Rose and Chernov Hwang point to a clear, if uneasy, path forward: absent sustained regional partnerships and durable arrest‑and‑detention practices, the tactical respite in attacks may prove temporary. The departure of American forces has lowered the cost of presence but raised the price of absence — a cost measured in diminished visibility, frayed detention systems, and a higher risk that ISIS will again exploit weaknesses in prisons, borders, and cooperation.
