"Chrome responded by blocking the unauthorized certificates for Google properties through CRLSets, the mechanism Chrome uses to quickly block certificates in emergencies." — Google Chrome Secure Web and Networking Team, October 6
Which ccTLDs were hijacked
Attackers compromised three country-code top-level domain registries and used that control to obtain unauthorized HTTPS certificates for several Google domains and for sites belonging to other organizations, Google said in a post published by its Chrome Secure Web and Networking Team on October 6. The incidents affected the .gh (Ghana), .sl (Sierra Leone) and .as (American Samoa) namespaces after attackers modified authoritative Domain Name System (DNS) records for those ccTLDs.
How DNS control created certificate risk
Google described a straightforward path from DNS hijack to certificate issuance: by controlling authoritative DNS records, attackers can interfere with the domain-control validation process that certificate authorities (CAs) use when issuing certificates. The incidents illustrate that a compromise of DNS infrastructure can affect HTTPS trust without directly breaching a website's own systems.

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See what we buildGoogle and Chrome's immediate technical response
Chrome used CRLSets — its emergency mechanism for quickly blocking certificates — to block the unauthorized certificates for impacted Google properties. Google said it worked with the issuing CAs to revoke the certificates so that users of other clients would be protected. Certificate Transparency (CT) logs then revealed additional organizations that Google believed had been affected; Google proactively blocked those certificates in Chrome and said it contacted affected organizations where possible. Google also stated it had no reason to believe the CAs that issued the affected certificates had acted improperly, and that the incidents did not involve a compromise of Google's own systems.
Limits of browser-side mitigation and Google’s ecosystem recommendations
Google warned browser-side blocking should not be relied upon as a complete defense because its analysis may not have identified every affected domain and because Chrome's interventions do not reliably protect non‑Chrome users. To reduce future risk, Google recommended that domain owners continuously monitor CT logs across their entire domain portfolios, including parked and regional ccTLD properties, and that organizations operating .gh, .sl or .as domains review recent CT entries for unexpected certificate issuance.
Google also recommended the use of restrictive Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) records combined with Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) account bindings. The company noted that while a restrictive CAA policy cannot prevent certificate issuance during an active DNS hijack, restoring such a policy afterward prevents attackers from reusing cached domain-control validation checks to obtain new certificates. Google said it will continue working on broader HTTPS ecosystem changes, including reducing certificate validity periods and the reuse of domain-control validation.
How technologists, affected enterprises, and end users should view this incident
- Technologists and security teams: Google’s post calls for continuous monitoring of CT logs across entire domain portfolios, including parked and regional ccTLD properties, and for implementing restrictive CAA records with ACME account bindings to limit reuse of cached validation after a DNS incident.
- Affected enterprises and procurement leaders: Several leading global brands and widely used online services were identified in CT logs as potentially affected; Google said it proactively blocked those certificates in Chrome and contacted affected organizations where possible, but did not identify them or disclose how many certificates were obtained.
- End users and browser operators: Chrome’s CRLSet blocking will protect Chrome users for the certificates Google identified, but Google warned this protection is not comprehensive and does not reliably protect users of other clients.
The incidents are a reminder that trust in HTTPS rests on layers — DNS, certificate issuance, and client-side validation — and that compromise at any one layer can produce real-world risk without touching a site’s application stack. Google’s combination of emergency blocking, CA revocations, CT monitoring, and recommendations for CAA/ACME controls addresses immediate exposure while pointing to longer-term changes it says the ecosystem needs, including shorter certificate validity and curbing the reuse of domain-control validation. Whether those broader changes can reduce the attack surface exposed by DNS compromises remains the next technical and operational question.
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/attackers-hijack-cctlds-obtain/




