The line lands like an editorial shrug: amid an era of dizzying change—AI pushing vendors to re-architect services, chips and datacenters reshaping cost models, and new entrants redefining what "secure" looks like—some legacy problems simply refuse to die. That juxtaposition is the throughline of a newsroom bulletin that pairs grand strategic shifts with the blunt, familiar headlines of operational failure: phishing, zero-days, ransomware and weak vendor hygiene all still in the mix.
Russians posing as Signal support to launch phishing attacks
One of the security items in the same roundup notes a resurgent, low-tech playbook: Russians are posing as Signal support to launch phishing attacks. The brief treats the technique as straightforward social engineering — adversaries impersonating a trusted service to obtain access or credentials rather than relying solely on exotic tooling. It’s a reminder that attackers continue to combine trust exploitation with whatever new capabilities they can access.
On‑prem SharePoint patches failed — now a zero-day in the wild
Also listed: Microsoft patches meant to repair on‑premises SharePoint did not fully resolve the underlying issue, and the product "is now under zero-day attack." That report flags two persistent operational themes: patching does not always equate to mitigation, and when an enterprise staple like on‑prem SharePoint is affected, exploitation routes can open quickly for any adversary watching for weakly remediated flaws.
This site is the portfolio.
OSINTSights runs on Cloudflare Workers, D1, R2, and Vectorize, with an AI pipeline on Hetzner ARM. Nubivance designed, built, and operates it. We do the same for clients.
See what we buildTen years of corporate ransomware and the staying power of old threats
The bulletin marks the ten‑year anniversary since the first corporate ransomware incident, noting Mikko Hyppönen's view that there is "no end in sight." The juxtaposition of a decade‑old business threat with the headline focus on AI-driven change underscores a simple point: new technology expands the attack surface, but it does not eliminate the incentives or methods that made ransomware, phishing and software vulnerabilities profitable in the first place.
How technologists, regulators, and users should read the mix of high strategy and low‑level failure
- Technologists and security teams — Watch for delegation gaps between strategic re‑architecture and operational patching. The bulletin’s items about failed SharePoint fixes and phishing impersonations indicate attackers will keep plucking at unpatched, unmonitored seams even as organizations invest in AI and scale. Expect to prioritize solid patch verification and user-facing anti-phishing controls.
- Policymakers and regulators — Note the imbalance between high‑level meetings and affected communities. Elsewhere in the roundup, a separate item observed UK ministers met AI datacenter bosses but not environmental groups; the same dynamic can apply to cyber policy when industry voices dominate the agenda without equivalent representation for downstream consumers and critical‑service operators.
- End users and enterprises — Classic hygiene still matters. Headlines about phishing campaigns that exploit trusted brands, a proximate SharePoint zero‑day, and the unresolved persistence of ransomware all point to the continuing value of training, access controls, and verified patch application.
The intellectual arc here is modest but instructive. The bulletin catalogues grand claims — companies re‑architecting services for AI, multi‑million‑core efforts to sustain cloud platforms, multibillion‑dollar investment and acquisition plays — alongside the quotidian failures that make headlines: impersonation phishing, failed patches, longstanding ransomware campaigns. That is the tension behind The Register’s rueful comfort about crypto exchanges: whether you are building the next generation of AI services or running an exchange for digital assets, the same basic security failures can still trip you up.
There is no definitive account in the roundup of any specific compromise at a crypto exchange, only the title’s assertion that crypto exchanges continue to suffer poor security. But the supporting headlines suggest why that could be unsurprising: adversaries use low‑cost social engineering and exploit incomplete patching; enterprise defenders juggle legacy systems and rapid change; and, after a decade, ransomware and opportunistic fraud remain stubbornly endemic.
If the era of AI does rewrite infosec’s rulebook, the rewrite appears additive rather than eliminative: new tools, larger attack surfaces and bigger economic stakes layer on top of long‑standing human and operational weaknesses. That makes the continuing presence of "bad security" less a failure of imagination than a predictable outcome of complexity outpacing remediation.
