China's PLA Revives Naval Rocket Launcher Concept

Two photographs circulating on the Chinese internet appear to show a pair of 122mm multiple rocket launchers still mounted aboard a PLA Army Landing Craft Medium (LCM) from the Southern Theater Command.

What the pictures show: a small hull with big rockets

The vessel in the photographs resembles a downsized version of the Type 073 landing ship medium, but the most striking detail is not the hull: it is the rockets. The images reportedly show two 122mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) carried on an Army LCM. The blog post noting the images frames this as a possible continuation — or a quiet persistence — of the navalized MRL concept that attracted attention two decades earlier.

Historical precedent: the Jiujiang experiment and the numbers that sparked debate

Observers first focused on the idea when the PLAN mounted five 25‑round 122mm MRLs on the Type 053H frigate Jiujiang (Hull 516) in the early 2000s. That installation amounted to 250 rockets (50 x 5), a system weight of roughly 5,000 kg, and a maximum effective range of about 20 km (30 km with extended‑range rockets). Performance details cited for that mount include elevation from 0–60 degrees, a traverse of ±120 degrees, a 50‑round salvo in 18–20 seconds, and maximum change rates of elevation and direction of 16 degrees per second.

At the time, public debate centered on whether a relatively small ship with 250 unguided rockets and no rapid reload capability could deliver the volume and accuracy required for amphibious fire support. By contrast, the blog post points to U.S. World War II LSM(R) vessels built around overwhelming volume — roughly 480 rockets — to illustrate the scale required when saturation and volume were the mission.

Two plausible explanations: revival, persistence, or parallel experimentation

The new photographs invite two readings. One is that the concept has been revived: navalized 122mm MRLs are back in service aboard amphibious craft. The alternative — and the one the post treats as equally plausible — is that the capability never really went away. The PLA Army and the PLAN may have experimented with similar ideas in parallel, but outside the more visible Jiujiang case the Army-side practice could have continued quietly.

Either interpretation rests on an operational logic the post highlights: if a launcher mount is serviceable, the hull remains operational, and the logistics chain exists, there is limited incentive to spend money removing the system. Put simply: if it still launches rockets, why take it off?

Procurement culture and the economics of 'good enough'

The post illustrates this point with a phrase reportedly common in procurement briefings: "New equipment costs money. Existing equipment is already paid for." That line captures a broader pattern the author traces across PLA procurement — a tendency to extend the life and remit of working solutions rather than retire them in favor of cleaner but costlier alternatives.

To reinforce the pattern, the post references another example previously discussed: a Bv206‑inspired articulated tracked carrier that was repeatedly repurposed — ambulance to command post to logistics carrier to weapons carrier — rather than retired. The implication is that the same institutional logic could keep rocket launchers bolted to landing craft for years simply because removing them would require a new budget decision.

What this means for the PLA Army, the PLAN, and analysts

• PLA Army: If the photographs reflect an Army‑operated practice, the Army may be maintaining a niche amphibious fire support option without the publicity and expense of a formal program. Continued use would fit a conservative cost calculus: retain a capability that is "good enough" and paid for.
• PLAN: For the navy, the Jiujiang experiment was visible and ultimately led to public debate; if the PLAN did not pursue follow‑on deployments, those decisions may have been driven by questions of range, accuracy, and reload logistics highlighted in earlier critiques.
• Analysts and observers: The new images should prompt examination of whether apparent one‑offs like Jiujiang represent isolated experiments or the public surface of longer‑running, less visible practices. The persistence of navalized MRLs aboard amphibious craft — even in small numbers — would be consistent with the procurement pattern the author describes.

The photographs do not, by themselves, settle whether naval 122mm MRLs are a revived capability or an artifact that simply never went away. What they do highlight is an institutional tendency: once a concept proves useful and is paid for, it can endure in new guises and on unexpected platforms. For observers, the key question is not only whether the rocket mounts are present, but how they are intended to be used and sustained — and whether their continued existence reflects strategic choice or the inertia of a paid‑for capability.

Original report