"If the army’s emerging littoral force is to become effective, the government must create an integrated northern logistics system from military and civilian capabilities," the ASPI report says.
Principal operating nodes: Darwin, Townsville and northwestern Australia
The Australian Army’s shift toward littoral manoeuvre and long‑range strike, described in The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2026, is built around a dispersed northern force. The new logistics picture the report outlines treats the northern theatre as a single system with principal operating nodes in Darwin, Townsville and northwestern Australia, and supporting depth in Brisbane and potentially Alice Springs and central Queensland. Those nodes must operate as complementary parts of one distribution network if the littoral force is to move, sustain and regenerate across sea, shore and inland environments.
Civilian capacity the ADF will depend on: ports, fuel, transport, maintenance, engineering, warehousing and workforce
Much of the northern logistics system sits outside Defence. The Australian Defence Force, allies and regional partners will depend on civilian and commercial capacity — including ports, fuel, transport, maintenance, engineering, warehousing and workforce — that is shared with the civilian economy and not readily expanded under surge conditions. A port that handles routine traffic may lack the margin for sustained military surge; fuel distribution can rely on narrow supply routes; roads and rail that meet normal commercial needs may become constrained when military demand coincides with civilian traffic; maintenance capacity that supports exercises may be insufficient for prolonged operations.
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End the scrambleClimate and contested‑environment risks: wet season, cyclones, long‑range strike, cyber and electronic attack
Resilience is not only a matter of capacity. The report highlights natural and adversary‑caused disruptions. Northern Australia’s wet‑season conditions and cyclones can close routes and constrain access. In a contested environment, those weather‑related closures could be compounded by long‑range strike, cyber or electronic attack against Defence and civilian critical infrastructure. Because the system is interdependent, a constraint in one element — a closed port, damaged fuel line, or lost maintenance node — can reduce the capacity of others.
From platforms to operational reach: landing craft, long‑range firepower and sustainment systems
The army is acquiring new landing craft, long‑range battlefield firepower, upgraded armoured vehicles and helicopters, and deployable health and logistics systems, and is developing or expanding northern bases, infrastructure and regional industry. But equipment alone does not create operational reach. New landing craft will expand options for projecting combat power between land and sea, yet their effectiveness depends on the infrastructure, workforce and commercial services available to move, sustain and regenerate a geographically dispersed force across northern Australia.
What this means for state and territory governments, industry, and Defence
- State and territory governments need clarity on Defence’s future requirements for roads, ports, industrial land, energy and workforce when planning regional infrastructure. The report argues that much of the required capacity cannot be created quickly, so planning must reflect anticipated sustainment and movement tasks.
- Industry needs sustained demand, appropriate contracting arrangements, security and technical accreditation, and workforce pathways to invest in regional maintenance, engineering, recovery, fabrication, transport and maritime services. The report warns that occasional military exercises are unlikely to provide the certainty required for significant private‑sector investment.
- Defence must define the functions of major nodes, the movement and sustainment tasks they must perform, and the capacity required to support them so that civilian and commercial partners — and subnational planners — can respond constructively.
The central proposition of the report is straightforward and stark: making the littoral force operational is not just a matter of platforms and bases, but of a connected northern logistics network that can deliver access, sustainment and resilience. Delivering that network will require deliberate, cross‑sector planning so ports, fuel systems, transport links, maintenance capacity and workplaces can scale and interoperate with Defence’s new capabilities — long before a crisis imposes demand they were not designed to meet.
